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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the will to win in asymmetric
war. Asymmetric war, in which one side has an overwhelming
advantage over its opponent, will likely be the war of the
future for the United States in the post-Cold War uni-polar
world. To win an asymmetric war, the individual and then
the masses must be motivated to fight and, ultimately, the
will to win must be cultivated and sustained for victory.
Religion is a highly effective motivator for both the
individual and the masses. This motivation, when properly
directed, can provide the will to win in the face of
overwhelming odds.
This thesis focuses on religion as the primary
motivator in an asymmetric war. Religion is a strong
motivator for the individual because of four factors:
appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion’s
strength as an internally consistent logic. With a highly
motivated individual, an organization gains specific
advantages by focusing on the religious aspects of the
conflict. These advantages are: commitment, legitimacy,
membership, and longevity. These are the measurable
elements that create a strong will to win.
Three case studies – Iran and Iraq, Hezbollah and
Israel, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Algeria -
are explored as examples of contemporary asymmetric
conflict. These case studies are used to examine the
asymmetries between the countries in conflict and test the
validity of our theory about the significance of the will
to win.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE STRIP, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
Captain Jamie O’Conner rolled to his back and his
thoughts were split on two very different things. First,
he wondered how long he could continue lying at poolside in
the Nevada sun without burning, and second, his mind
drifted back to Afghanistan. The desert heat sure brought
back memories of his time north of Herat. Jamie, now a
reserve Special Forces officer, had done two tours in
Afghanistan while on active duty.
His first 6-month tour was the best. Jamie worked
with Master Sergeant Mark Phillips and Sergeant First Class
Angel Vasquez as a liaison element attached to a 500-man
Herati unit. All three were chosen because of their
language skills. Jamie speaks Persian - and not too badly
- after his first tour of on-the-job training. His element
was very autonomous and had very little contact with other
US forces. In fact, his only contact for a couple of
months at a time was the twice-daily satellite
communication with the Forward Operating Base (FOB) and the
weekly aerial resupply. Their primary mode of travel was
by horse or motorcycle (even though the team had a HMMWV).
Everyday brought a new experience and while sometimes life
was dangerous, it was always exciting. Missions just did
not get any better than this.
That all changed during Jamie’s second 6-month tour.
After a short 90-day rotation back to the States, Jamie was
sentenced to work as an Assistant Operations Officer in the
FOB at the Shindand Airbase. This did not make any sense
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to him. He was an action guy with ground experience, and
now he could actually converse in the local dialect. The
Army and its infinite wisdom no longer agreed with Jamie,
the former action guy, and he decided to resign after
returning to the US. The process took a bit longer than
anticipated, but now Jamie is a civilian.
It is now over two years since the 2002 Winter
Olympics in Utah. The Olympics were not particularly
memorable except for the constant paranoia and several
terrorist hoaxes that marred the event. It has been over
one year since the last confirmed terrorist strike on
American soil. The Microsoft CEO was lucky, but
unfortunately, his driver was not. Ever since the Alcatraz
ferry hijacking and the incident at the Golden Gate Bridge
in San Francisco, domestic terrorist targets have shifted
to government leaders and then to business leaders. While
still problematic for the country, the general populace has
breathed a collective sigh of relief and accepted the
current level of terrorism. Jamie smiled as he began to
think that he could get too soft living this civilian life.
Jamie never contemplated for very long and rarely
allowed disturbing thoughts. He compartmentalized most
things in his life, especially those from the past. But,
his mind was still on Afghanistan and the people of that
godforsaken land. The Nevada desert certainly resembled
parts of Afghanistan, but it was the people that made the
difference to Jamie. In Afghanistan, the men were ‘real
men’ and the women were surprisingly beautiful, actually
exotic. But even after living in direct contact with the
Heratis, Jamie never felt he could ever completely
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understand the people or the culture. His intermittent
interaction with the enemy Taliban normally occurred after
they had left this world for paradise or their after-life.
Jamie had seen his share of death, and really only three
things bothered him from Afghanistan. The wounded or the
lack thereof seemed strange. Of course, the reality was
obvious, but it was easier not to think about the obvious.
The children or the lack thereof was disturbing. Actually,
there were plenty of young people; it was the innocence of
youth that was missing. Lastly, the look of defiance in
the eyes of a captured Taliban soldier always gave Jamie
pause. The look was not necessarily as disturbing as it
was puzzling.
The US military had entered Afghanistan in the latter
part of 2001, after the horrific terrorist attacks in New
York City and Washington D.C. And US soldiers are still
there. Osama bin Laden is gone, presumed dead, and the
Taliban government quickly dissolved into renegade bands.
The UN missions are now peacekeeping and nation-building
with an anticipated long-term occupation. Remnants of the
Taliban still exist throughout the mountains south of
Kandahar and in Pakistan. Jamie figured that these
disorganized groups would not have made it through the
first winter, but they did and are now enduring their
second winter. What, he couldn’t help but wonder, do they
hope to gain through continued resistance?
Jamie can’t imagine how the remnants of the Taliban
continue their armed resistance. Yet, every other week or
so, the major news networks report another attack of some
type against the UN forces in Afghanistan. American
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casualty statistics aren’t outrageous; in fact, they are
not really higher than during any high-risk training
exercise. Of course, training exercises do not last for
over two years. While Jamie had experienced more than one
near death situation, he was never particularly concerned
about his own safety. Even now, his only real concern is
maximizing his time and enjoyment with his wife. They were
married almost five years ago and are finally reconnecting
on this Vegas getaway. The trip wasn’t a planned second
honeymoon, but after traveling a very rocky road since the
first honeymoon, this trip was just what a counselor might
have ordered.
Jamie began to again think about the defiance of the
captured Taliban soldier. He must have had a family. Why
would he continue to resist instead of caring for his
family? Wouldn't it be easier to just accept the new
government instead of fighting against it? Of course, the
new government is hardly ideal. But, combined with
international support, it is relatively powerful in the
region, while the leaderless Taliban offer nothing to a man
who needs to support his family. The weak decentralized
bands of Taliban are armed with nothing more than rifles,
mortars, and possibly some anti-tank rockets. The new
government soldiers are experienced fighters who are well
schooled in the art of war and are continually improving
themselves through training and weapons stockpiling. What
advantage could the Taliban possibly have over the Afghan
government forces?
Jamie did the half-awake, half-asleep startled jerk
that scares you and looks hilarious to anyone that is
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watching. He realized that he needed to get out of the
sun. He had thought enough about Afghanistan and who cares
anyway? Jamie didn’t care about Afghanistan anymore; it
was half a world away. When he was there he had been
motivated by the adventure and his desire to serve his
country. It was now time to move on with life, and with
that he rose from the poolside lounge. As he stood, he
felt something. First, it was the slight pressure in his
ears just like before they pop during elevation changes.
Then it was a flash, not really blinding, but bright enough
to make everyone look up. During this instant, Jamie
thought of Nellis Air Force Base located just north of Las
Vegas. He had never been to the base, but had seen it on
his Nevada road map on the way into Vegas. The explosion
was loud and the noise did not just come from the direction
of the blast. The most terrifying sound was the imploding
glass. Glass was suddenly everywhere on ‘The Strip’ and
the sound of so much breaking glass mixed with screams is
now the fourth thing that Jamie will never forget.
B. ASYMMETRIC WAR IN AMERICA
An attack on Nellis AFB, which results in large-scale
destruction and loss of life in Las Vegas, is no longer
inconceivable for the average American. Whether the
attacker is the fugitive militant Osama bin Laden, the
remnants of the Taliban, or a splinter group from Al Qaeda
is not important for the victims and, for the moment, this
discussion. The puzzling question for us is why one would
start a fight that can’t be won? This is not golf, where
the pleasure and competition of playing is more important
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than winning or losing. This ‘game’ instead defines
winning in terms of life and losing in terms of death. It
seems that the logical choice, should winning not be
possible, is to not play. Yet, the games continue.
Why then would a weaker power choose to physically
engage a stronger power? Two obvious answers come to mind.
First, the weaker power does not realize it is weak. Or
second, conventionally weak or not, people truly believe
they can win. A third possibility borrows from both of
these. Arguably, the most dangerous enemy is the one that
knows it is weak (therefore it knows itself) and at the
same time knows the enemy is strong (which means it knows
its enemy), but still envisions victory.
This thesis explores the will to win in asymmetric
war. Specifically, the masses must be motivated and,
ultimately, the individual must have the will to win.
Religion can motivate the individual and, subsequently,
motivate the masses. This motivation, when properly
directed, can fuel the will to win regardless of the
overwhelming odds. Perhaps this is what the fictional
character Jamie O’Conner saw in the eyes of the captured
Taliban soldier. “The faith is crucial, not the
techniques. Without the faith there would be no armed
struggle” (Bell, 1999, p. 127).
This thesis focuses on religion as the motivator.
Religion is a strong motivator for the individual because
of these four factors ─ appropriateness, identity,
rationality, and religion’s role as an internally
consistent logic. Next, after an individual is motivated,
an organization gains specific other advantages by using
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religion. These advantages are the tangible elements that
bolster a strong will to win. They are commitment,
legitimacy, membership, and longevity.
The three case studies exemplify contemporary
asymmetric conflict. Through case studies we examine the
asymmetries between the forces involved in conflict and
consider what might allow weaker powers to prevail over
stronger powers. Religious motivation and a strong will to
win are factors in each of these case studies. In the case
of Hezbollah versus Israel we see Islam being used against
non-Muslims from two different countries. In the case of
Algeria, Muslims are fighting Muslims within the same
country. Finally, with the Iran and Iraq war, we have two
Muslim countries fighting against each other. After
exploring the commonalities among these cases, we hope to
offer some possible measures that can be used to counter
others’ spiritual motivation.
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II. OUR NEW WAR
A. WHY ASYMMETRIC WARFARE?
A weaker military force fighting and defeating a
stronger military force characterizes asymmetric warfare.
The Vietnam conflict represents a classic example of this
type of war. Over the span of thirty years, both France
and the United States were unsuccessful in defeating the
Vietnamese forces.
Over the last half-century, the change that has
taken place is momentous. From France to the
United States, there has scarcely been one
‘advanced’ government in Europe and North America
whose armed forces have not suffered defeat at
the hands of under equipped, ill-trained, ill-
organized, often even ill-clad, underfed, and
illiterate freedom fighters or guerrillas or
terrorists; briefly, by men ― and, often, women ―
who were short on everything except high courage
and the determination to endure and persist in
the face of police operations, counterinsurgency
operations, peacekeeping operations, and whatever
other types of operations that were dreamt up by
their masters (van Creveld, 1999, p. 395).
American military power is presently unequaled. This fact
virtually eliminates the likelihood of US involvement in a
future symmetric war. But the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon indicate that there are
still organizations willing to challenge the power of the
US. As a result, it appears that asymmetric warfare will
once again dominate US foreign and military policy. Just
as the North Vietnamese victory in 1975 marked a turning
point for US military strategy, the events of September 11,
2001 have brought asymmetric warfare back to the forefront
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of military thinking. This change in focus justifies a
re-examination of asymmetric warfare in an attempt to
identify the circumstances that make victory possible for
the weaker military force.
Typically, the primary difference between a stronger
and weaker force lies in available resources. Resources
include population, military equipment, manufacturing
ability, and, of course, natural resources (food, oil,
etc). “The asymmetric relationship is thus a function of
the asymmetry in ‘resource power’” (Mack, 1975, p. 186).
However, resource power and global influence are not the
only asymmetries worthy of attention. Analyst Thomas
Mahnken (1993) writes:
Any conflict between the United States and a
regional adversary would be highly asymmetric.
Most fundamentally, the two antagonists would
view such a confrontation in very different
terms. In other words, what is for Americans a
war for limited objectives may become for a
regional power a contest for national survival
(p. 175).
The conflict between the United States and Somalia in 1992-
1993 exemplifies these asymmetric views. The US perceived
its objectives to be humanitarian ― to include nation-
building and peace-enforcement. Mohamed Farrah Aidid and
the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) viewed survival as
their primary objective and declared war on the US on 12
July 1993. Although ultimately the US wanted to capture
Aidid and remove him from power, the US never declared war
against the SNA. These facts represented an asymmetry in
views between the US and Somalia.
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General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietminh strategist,
studied the classic guerilla strategists, Sun Tzu and Mao
Zedong, and concluded that following a strategy of
attacking the enemy’s weaknesses while avoiding the enemy’s
strengths would result in victory. According to Bevin
Alexander (1995) Giap successfully took advantage of enemy
weaknesses. To do so he had to recognize the enemy’s
strengths and weaknesses. Alexander intimates that, in
addition, Giap had a strong desire to win. As a factor,
the desire to win depends on the motivations of the
combatants and their asymmetric objectives. As Manhnken
points out, “Because a third world state will be unable to
destroy the physical ability of the United States to wage
war, it may be forced instead to choose a strategy aimed at
undermining the political will to do so” (Mahnken, 1975, p.
175). The desire to win can be an incomparable asset in
assisting a weaker military power to defeat a stronger
military power.
A weaker military force can coerce a stronger foe into
a stalemate by being tactically more proficient and by
strategically attacking the enemy’s weaknesses while
avoiding the enemy’s strengths. At the height of the
Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger (1969) coined the following
maxim: “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The
conventional army loses if it does not win” (p. 214). This
statement, while true, does not tell the whole story, as a
guerrilla war can still end with a stalemate, not a
victory.
Nevertheless, possessing a stronger will to win can
help even the playing field. So can attacking an
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opponent’s will to continue. “For centuries, even
millennia, weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their
enemy’s technological or numerical superiority by fighting
in ways or on battlefields that nullify it” (Goulding,
2000, p. 21). As Mahnken (1975) puts it: “In effect, an
adversary would fight two wars: one to avoid defeat by U.S.
armed forces on the battlefield, another to undermine U.S.
will to remain in a war” (p. 179).
B. HOW TO WIN IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
Research has not yielded a silver bullet that will
guarantee success for either opponent in an asymmetric war.
However, a close study of a number of asymmetric conflicts
does reveal numerous principles that, when applied, can
increase the probability of success. These principles for
success are found in a variety of sources, from Sun Tzu’s
The Art of War, to U.S. Army doctrine found in Field Manual
100-20, to graduate work at the US Naval Postgraduate
School. Interestingly, as varied as these sources are, all
mention or allude to the desire and will to win.
For instance, Sun Tzu identifies five factors for
success:
One who knows when he can fight, and when he
cannot fight, will be victorious.
One who recognizes how to employ large and small
numbers will be victorious.
One whose upper and lower ranks have the same
desires will be victorious.
One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared
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will be victorious.
One whose general is capable and not interfered
with by the ruler will be victorious.
These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory (Sun
Tzu, 1994, pp. 178-179).
In western military terms, Sun Tzu proposes that knowledge
of strategy, tactics, desire, preparation, and leadership
is the key factor for victory. Successful application of
these factors will lead to success on the battlefield.
Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and
knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred
engagements. One who does not know the enemy but
knows himself will sometimes be victorious,
sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows
neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be
defeated in every engagement (Sun Tzu, 1994, p.
179).
Strategy, tactics, and leadership are self-explanatory, but
desire and preparation require some interpretation and
explanation. Preparation is very broad and can encompass
full logistical readiness, advances in technology, or
training readiness. Desire should be uniform throughout
the military, as well as in society at large and among
civilian leaders. This uniformity of desire will in turn
lead to a unity of effort. Sun Tzu does not specifically
mention the desire to win, but given that the ultimate
objective of war is victory, the will to win must be
present at all levels to satisfy his principle.
Although Sun Tzu developed his principles over four
thousand years ago, his insights prove timeless. According
to U.S. Army and Air Force doctrine for planning low
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intensity conflict (LIC), “Success in LIC requires planning
and conducting operations based on the following
imperatives: political dominance, unity of effort,
adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance” (FM 100-20,
1990, p. 1-5). The call for unity of effort and
perseverance is in keeping with Sun Tzu’s formula for
victory. These imperatives themselves strongly allude to
the will or desire to win. “Perseverance is the patient,
resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and
objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them” (FM
100-20, 1990, p. 1-6). Perseverance, combined with a
desire for the pursuit of victory, constitutes what we
refer to in this thesis as the will to win.
Michael Lwin, in his thesis, proposed four factors
which he considers “critical to the success or failure of a
weak state’s asymmetric strategy: skilled army, national
will, external support, and counter strategy” (Lwin, 1997,
p. 82). In his thesis Lwin demonstrates how, when these
factors are combined, the weaker power can defeat a
stronger power in an asymmetric conflict. Lwin (1997) goes
on to note that, “National will is probably the one area
considered by ourselves and our enemies to be our greatest
weakness” (p. 84). Thus, as far as he is concerned, the
U.S. should prepare for attacks on its national will and
expect that any asymmetric adversary will do everything in
its power to maintain its own strong will to win. We
concur.
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C. WHAT CONSTITUTES THE WILL TO WIN IN WAR?
The will to win has always mattered in war. Just
consider: “Xenophon, himself an experienced soldier and
troop commander, wrote almost 2500 years ago that ‘I am
sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but
whichever army goes into battle stronger in its soul’”
(Gabriel, 1997, p. 46). It is this soul or drive that
enables soldiers to endure the hardships and anticipated
horrors associated with war. Psychologist Jules Masserman
describes three key beliefs that he calls ‘the Ur defenses
of man’: “The first of these beliefs [Ur defense] is that
there is a connection between a man’s actions and what
happens to him” (Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). For example, the
soldier who follows his orders, tries his hardest, and does
the right thing will survive the battle. The second Ur
defense is that, “Man is sustained by the belief (however
unfounded at times) that he is not alone and that if he
does all he can to survive and the danger still grows,
someone - perhaps even God - will come to his aid and save
him” (Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). This alludes to the
importance of religious faith and the power of religion to
motivate. The last Ur defense is that, “Even under the
most trying of circumstances, men must continue to believe
that they will somehow survive or else they collapse”
(Gabriel, 1987, p. 82). Religion does not just reinforce
and support each of these psychological defenses, it also
fosters them. Religion can motivate the individual and
subsequently motivate the masses. This motivation creates
the will to win and provides the weaker force with an
invaluable asset for engaging in asymmetric warfare.
15
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III.RELIGION: A MOTIVATOR FOR WAR
Modern warfare changed direction after the Allied
victory in Operation DESERT STORM. Between 1945 and 1989,
the USSR and US prepared to fight a conventional/nuclear
war on the plains of Europe. Ultimately, the Allied
victory over Iraq in 1991 ended the Cold War. That short
desert war proved to the enemies of America who were not
yet convinced, that it would be suicidal to square off
against US conventional forces. With the chance of nuclear
or conventional war unlikely in the future, it seems safe
to assume that asymmetric warfare will remain the focus for
military planners.
Asymmetric warfare, the seemingly lopsided conflict
between strong and weak forces, takes on many forms. From
guerrilla war to terrorist acts, asymmetric war also takes
a special kind of soldier, a soldier who is motivated by a
combination of personal, political, economic, and religious
impulses. Although each of these motivators has their
respective strengths, religion appears to be the strongest
of the four.
As technology brings the world closer together,
ancient feuds continue to grab the spotlight. The
following headlines appeared in the New York Times
newspaper during the past year:
• The Warship Explosion: The Overview; Blast Kills
Sailors on U.S. Ship in Yemen (13 Oct 2000).
• Troops Kill 4 in Gaza; 2 Die in Car Bombing in
Israel (23 Nov 2000).
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• Attack on Mosque in Sudan By Fundamentalists
Kills 20 (10 Dec 2000).
• Indonesian Leader Condemns Church Bombings That
Killed 15 (26 Dec 2000).
• Algeria Is Found Guilty In Plot To Bomb Sites In
The U.S. (7 Apr 2001).
• The Terror Verdict: The Overview; 4 Guilty In
Terror Bombings Of 2 U.S. Embassies In Africa;
Jury To Weigh 2 Executions (30 May 2001).
• U.S. Attacked; Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers
and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror (12 September
2001).
(source: New York Times archive search for ‘Religious
Terrorism or Terror’. Retrieved on October 18, 2001 from
the World Wide Web: http://search.nytimes.com/search/)
As these headlines suggest, various forms of
religiously motivated asymmetric warfare can occur in a
wide range of societies in disparate parts of the world.
This chapter will examine the reasons why religion proves
such an ideal motivator for violence. Also, the advantages
that religious motivation lends groups waging asymmetric
war will be discussed.
A. RELIGION AS A MOTIVATOR?
Trying to determine why religion is such a strong
motivator for violence is as difficult as defining religion
itself. Although there are a number of possible
definitions for religion, the one that seems to accommodate
all religions without offending anyone comes from the
Religious Tolerance Organization (RTO). According to its
website, RTO proposes that religion be defined as, “…any
specific system of belief about deity, often involving
18
rituals, a code of ethics, and a philosophy of life”
(Religious Tolerance Organization, 2001).
Religion motivates at both the individual and group
level. For the individual, religion provides, among other
things, a sense of hope for the future, giving the believer
the inner strength and confidence to at least attempt to
overcome seemingly impossible tasks. At a minimum,
religious rituals offer the believer feelings of stability,
commitment, and a sense of belonging to something greater
than himself. When like-minded believers are unified by a
single purpose, they represent a formidable group. When
religion’s individual benefits are combined with an
organizational structure, the result is an attractive
package that religious and secular groups can exploit to
meet their respective goals.
In addition to these benefits, religion is also
attractive because it is timeless. In general, religion
has outlasted empires and nations. For this reason alone,
even groups not intent on influencing the masses for either
secular or religious reasons are likely to be interested in
using religion. Even in the short term, a religiously
based philosophy can be beneficial. For instance, an
emerging group has little time to get its message out.
Using religion as a vehicle to communicate with the masses
not only allows for quick dissemination, but also adds some
credibility to the message.
Another reason that religion can prove so attractive
to a group is that it is more than likely already
established in the area of concern. When it is already
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present, religion offers a ready-made means of
mobilization, as well as a formal social structure.
The use of religion as a motivator thus simultaneously
benefits both individuals and the group. Furthermore,
there is an ancient relationship between religion and
violence that is used by some groups despite most peoples’
presumptions about religion’s usual promise of peace.
B. RELIGION AND VIOLENCE
History is filled with accounts of conquests by
civilizations done in the name of God. From the Crusaders
marching to the Holy Land to the modern version of Islamic
jihad, religion has provided the motivation necessary for
civilizations and their armies to destroy each other.
Author Mark Juergensmeyer identifies four reasons why
religion will always be associated with violence. These
have to do with loyalty and commitment, religion’s violent
nature and origins, the influence of religious doctrine in
creating violence, and the connection between religious and
political interests accompanied by the lure of religious
power for secular interests (Juergensmeyer, 1992).
Not even political scientist and religious terrorism
expert David Rapoport (1992) can explain this phenomenon,
except to say that religion inspires the ultimate
commitment. It is this commitment that enables a group to
fight the asymmetric fight and lends individuals the
motivation to be suicide bombers or to attack tanks with
rocks. This commitment is seen at various levels in
different organizations. It is probably best exemplified
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by the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. As author Hala
Jaber notes,
As far as Hezbollah is concerned, fighting
Israel’s occupation is not just a national duty.
It is a religious obligation that falls within
their concept of jihad and they are determined to
continue the fight until Lebanese soil is
liberated and every Israeli soldier has withdrawn
from the country (Jaber, 1997, p. 60).
The benefits that commitment and loyalty provide to an
organization, while fairly obvious, will be discussed later
in the chapter.
Most people feel that religion should grant them
tranquility and peace, not terror. Juergensmeyer (2000)
points out that violence may be found at the deepest levels
of religious imagination, in biblical wars, crusades,
ritual acts of sacrifice, and acts of martyrdom.
“Violence,” he claims, “has lurked as a shadowy presence…
and images of death have never been far from the heart of
religion’s power to stir the imagination” (p. 6). It is as
if religion needs violence and violence needs religion to
justify actions by divine mandate. As a result, historical
precedents justify acts of religious violence
(Juergensmeyer, 2000).
But religion cannot be blamed for all social ills.
Juergensmeyer notes that although religion is not
completely innocent, it does not always lead to violence.
Violence only erupts when a particular set of circumstances
― social, political, and ideological ― join with violent
expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and
movements for political change (Juergensmeyer, 2000).
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There are other theories about the relationship
between religion and violence. René Girard proposes that
religious ritual was created as a defensive response to
outside threats. Religion provided a basic structure on
which to build and maintain a defensive posture. In order
to survive, man had to live in groups. The family unit
became the basis for the group structure. Once familial
obligations were met, the group’s needs were addressed.
After the familial and tribal responsibilities were met,
loyalties could then be transferred to either a government
or a religious structure. Like government, religion can
bring together families and tribes under broader control.
Under these circumstances, religion becomes a vehicle for
organizing the masses. But in contrast to his relationship
with government, the individual can usually choose whether
or not to adhere to a religion. Even those forced to
attend religious services do not have to participate in the
spiritual sense; going through the motions usually
satisfies even the concerned observer.
Religion, in its basic form, supplies the individual
with structure and rules to live by. Success, in religious
terms, comes from living the “good life,” while reward lies
in the promise of the next life. Christians, for example,
believe a good life on earth will result in being able to
enter the gates of heaven and live for eternity, while the
Islamic martyr is promised unimaginable pleasures upon his
death. One way religion organizes and then motivates the
masses is by providing after-life incentives.
Religious doctrine can be interpreted in a number of
different ways. The same doctrine, interpreted
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differently, may lead to peaceful, positive actions or to
violence. For example, one Islamic group may answer a call
for jihad by ensuring that future generations will have
adequate health care and education, thereby increasing the
chances of the group’s long-term survival. Another group
may interpret these same words as a call to arms. It is
these instances that terrorism expert David Rapoport is
referring to when he cites the influence of religious
doctrine in fomenting violence. Taken to the extreme,
religion can inspire violence in believers who feel not
only the violent act will bring about the desired outcome.
Rapoport notes that throughout history there are many
examples of violent acts undertaken by those who believed
they were adhering to doctrine, ranging from religious war
to suicide bombers (Rapoport, 1990).
Rapoport’s point about the connection between religion
and doctrine is based on two factors, timelessness and
strength. Because we have already described religion’s
timelessness, this section will focus mainly on the
spiritual strength religion offers to the individual and
the organization. This strength marks the difference
between religion and other motivators. What renders
religion stronger than nationalism, communism, or
capitalism as motivators is that they lack religion’s
spiritual dimension. Although self-preservation and
familial protection are strong motivators, they are not
mass motivators. Religion is not only a mass-motivator but
it addresses humans’ spiritual needs.
Four factors help generate religion’s strength as a
motivator. These factors can be characterized as
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appropriateness, identity, rationality, and religion’s role
as an internally consistent logic.
1. Appropriateness
Dr. Gordon McCormick of the US Naval Postgraduate
School proposes a motivation theory, which he uses to
categorize terrorist groups. McCormick’s theory, which
examines terrorist decision-making logic, can be carried
over to other organizations. According to McCormick,
pragmatists follow a logic of consequence because they base
decisions on preferences and cost-benefit analysis.
Purists, on the other hand, follow a logic of
appropriateness because they base decisions on identity and
an inclination to follow the rules. Pragmatists and the
purists form two ends of a spectrum into which all
terrorists can be fitted. A group, which espouses violence
to further an ideology, more than likely uses the logic of
appropriateness, while a group seeking power through
terrorism employs the logic of consequence. Terrorists
motivated by appropriateness are much more difficult to
defeat. The tactics used against these groups include re-
indoctrination and redefining appropriateness. To combat
groups following the logic of consequence requires that
attention be focused on the organization’s cost-benefit
analysis with the aim of increasing its costs. Changing
others’ beliefs and values is far more complicated than
increasing their costs. Because religion follows the logic
of appropriateness it turns out to be extremely powerful as
a motivator and very difficult to attack.
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2. Identity
Religion provides individuals with identity. Seeking
identity and/or purpose in life strongly shapes
individuals’ decisions and actions. Religion can offer an
identity both during and after this life. For instance,
martyrdom represents an example of identity achieved with
death.
Martyrdom, represents the voluntary acceptance of
death in order to ‘demonstrate the truth’, is a
central and perhaps critical element of the
message giving religions (especially
Christianity, Islam, and to a lesser extent,
Judaism), for it dispels the doubts of believers
and aids proselytizing efforts (Rapoport, 1990,
p. 122).
The individual is able to achieve identity and purpose
through martyrdom, while providing an organization with the
material needed to recruit more martyrs. With an army of
martyrs, an organization has a powerful weapon with which
to wage asymmetric war against a superior enemy force.
Perhaps the most prominent martyrs in today’s world
are suicide bombers. Their strategy ― which is to blow up
themselves and their victims ― first came to prominence in
the 1980s as a means by which a weaker force could engage
an asymmetrically superior force. Hezbollah and Hamas
martyrs today continue to achieve the status and identity
of national heroes.
3. Rationality
A religion’s influence is based on the strength of
belief demonstrated by its followers. By definition,
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followers consider their religion and its doctrine to be
rational and will defend both to the end. A rational
person can be defined as someone who does not completely
discount the future or as someone who calculates and plans
to reach specific ends. An irrational person, then, can be
defined as someone who is only concerned with the moment.
Because most people appear to be unable to completely
discount the future, they can be considered rational.
Also, because religion is about following prescribed
religious practices with the aim of living a good life and
then going to one’s just reward, religion cannot be
considered irrational. Arguably, the organization
motivated by religion is super-rational, providing
stability and a long-term sense of purpose.
4. Internally Consistent Logic
The last and most powerful factor that makes religion
such a strong motivator is its internally consistent logic.
For those of faith, religion cannot be disproved. Even the
atheist, who disbelieves the existence of God, becomes
agnostic when asked to prove his belief. If there can be
no proof of the existence of God, then there is no denying
the possibility that God exists. This is the power of
religion as an internally consistent logic.
The power of other motivators, such as nationalism or
communism for example, can be quickly disproved.
Nationalism has mutated into fascism and communism has
collapsed. Religions continue to exist because they have
remained flexible and have changed with the times. The
combination of the irrefutability and the ambiguity of
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religion makes this possible, and just adds to religion’s
power to motivate. An organization has much to gain and
very little to lose by using religion as a motivator.
C. ADVANTAGES GAINED BY THE ORGANIZATION
The discussion to this point has focused on the
relationship between religion and violence, and the
strength of religion as a motivator. The question now is
what benefits does religion provide an organization?
An organization benefits in four ways when using
religion as a motivator: it gains commitment, legitimacy,
membership, and longevity. These benefits provide the
organization with the ability to fight the asymmetric
battle. Typically, in asymmetric warfare, the ultimate
victory is not necessarily a decisive tactical engagement.
Sustained strategic success is more important. These
benefits encourage the organization to sustain itself
despite facing overwhelming odds, and can ultimately lead
to victory. The Vietnam War is an example of ‘victory
through survival’. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the weaker force can defeat a stronger force by achieving a
stalemate or better. Under the right circumstances,
religion provides the motivation to sustain the fight.
1. Commitment
As examined earlier in this chapter, using religion as
a motivator for violence results in a strong commitment
from the believer to act in the name of God. The Ayatollah
Khomeini, for example, used his fiery sermons to inspire
his volunteer militias to participate in suicidal “human
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wave” attacks. It was their belief that their deaths were
for the greater good (while at the same time guaranteeing
them a good seat in heaven) that ultimately led the men and
boys to willingly sacrifice themselves. This commitment,
used in the right way, provides an organization with a very
powerful tool for furthering its cause.
2. Legitimacy
Religion offers legitimacy to an organization. Hamas
gained legitimacy through invoking jihad and by promoting
the spread of Islam. “Hamas perceives Islam in a defensive
position, struggling against a local as well as an
international environment that is openly hostile towards
Muslims” (Nüsse, 1998, p. 83). This defensive stance finds
favor among the masses who then see the link between Hamas
and Islam. As an internally consistent logic, Islam, in
turn, lends credibility to Hamas, and thereby secures its
legitimacy. When an organization uses religion for
legitimacy it becomes very difficult to discredit.
3. Membership
By design, religion offers an organization a large
population from which to recruit members and fill its
ranks. Recruiting from this population is possible for two
reasons. First, religion is ubiquitous as most people
espouse some form of religion. Second, religion can cross
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and even national boundaries.
In many cases, such as those represented by Islam, religion
regulates and mixes the powers of civil and political life
(Norval, 1999). Hezbollah, for instance, has built an
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entire social welfare system in Lebanon. “Hezbollah’s
social services, the group’s social work has succeeded in
transforming it into something ‘larger than a party, yet
smaller than a state’” (Jaber, 1997, p. 168). These
actions are attractive to many, and at least tolerable or
useful to the rest of the population.
4. Longevity
Lastly, religion provides the organization with
longevity and the ability to survive the war, not just the
battle. Longevity is critical to a weaker opponent in an
asymmetric conflict. The ability to endure derives from
individuals’ commitment, the organization’s legitimacy, and
a bountiful membership. All four of these factors
contribute to perseverance and the will to win. The
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its
asymmetric fight against Israel exemplify this. In 1982,
the PLO was virtually destroyed physically, but through
perseverance and unity, the organization survived and has
evolved into its own political entity (Lerman, 1982). This
will to win, or to survive, would be impossible without
commitment, legitimacy, membership, and organization.
D. SUMMARY
Religious motivation is prevalent in conflict around
the globe today. Religion is used and will have continued
use in the future because obtaining religious goals may be
a primary objective, or because religion may double as
motivational and structural means to rally the masses.
Religion is a strong motivator because it follows the logic
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of appropriateness, offers identity, is rational, and
constitutes an internally consistent logic. Organizations
can secure individual commitment, further their own
legitimacy, gain a large membership and, most importantly,
secure their own longevity when they employ religion as a
motivator. Thus, it is particularly useful in asymmetric
warfare, as the cases to be examined in this thesis will
reveal.
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IV. CASE STUDY #1: HEZBOLLAH AND ISRAEL
Nations and civilizations have gone to war for a
number of reasons. Wars have been waged over political
differences, alliances, natural resources, or access to
those resources. Not surprisingly, religious differences
have also been a source of conflict throughout history.
From the holy wars recorded in the Old Testament of the
Bible to the twenty-first century version of Jihad, history
is filled with tales of “true believers” fighting wars in
the name of God.
The current situation in the Middle East provides an
excellent example of ancient feuds continuing into modern
times. As the theological and geographic center of three
of the world’s major religions ― Christianity, Judaism and
Islam ― the Middle East seems destined to be a battleground
for religious-based conflict. These conflicts span the
spectrum of intensity as religious groups fight one another
for power and influence. From inter-religious turmoil to
fighting off external threats, religiously motivated
conflict seems to have an added dimension that is not
present in secularly oriented wars. As author Mark Pinsky
(1997) notes, “…faith, the essence of religious commitment,
makes a formidable motivator” (p. 1).
Often, this extra edge that religious motivation
provides is all that a group brings with it to battle
against a larger, better equipped force. In Middle East
history, there are many examples of this type of asymmetric
war in which a weaker force fights and defeats a stronger
force. From the Jewish defenders at Masada to T.E.
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Lawrence and his guerrilla campaign on the Arabian
Peninsula during World War I, the idea of asymmetric
warfare is not new to the region.
The implications of this type of asymmetric conflict
can be explored by examining the “war” between the state of
Israel and Hezbollah during the closing years of the
twentieth century. Although this undeclared war between
Israel and Hezbollah has many facets, it is ultimately a
battle in which religious differences have been used as
motivators.
If we use Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu’s principles of
warfare as a gauge, it appears that Israel was clearly the
superior force. After comparing the strategic, tactical,
preparation, and leadership aspects on both sides, western
analysis would point to an easy Israeli victory. Yet, the
conflict between the two has been raging for at least
twenty years, with no end in sight. The question then is,
what else is Hezbollah bringing to the fight? Does
religious motivation gained from Islam provide the
organization with what it needs to make up for deficiencies
elsewhere? Is this religious motivation stronger than the
feeling of national survival that motivates the Israelis?
A. BACKGROUND
At the heart of the current Middle East conflict is
the existence of the state of Israel. Born in controversy
over fifty years ago, Israel continues to be a painful
reminder to the Arab world of battles lost and dreams
unfulfilled. Officially created by the United Nations from
the Palestinian mandate in 1948, Israel’s short history can
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be characterized as that of a state at continuous risk.
From the beginning, the surrounding Arab states regarded
Israel as simply the next in a long line of oppressive
intruders out to wrest control over the area’s limited land
and resources. Whatever hopes Israel had for a peaceful
beginning did not last long as the Arab states immediately
declared war. While the Israelis had a slight numerical
advantage in men, it was conceivable that the Arab forces
could mass resources and men and crush the upstart nation.
For a number of reasons, however, the Arab states were
unable to fight a cohesive battle. Israel, on the other
hand, fighting for its national survival, was able to
mobilize and defeat the Arab forces. This scenario would
be repeated three more times over the next twenty-five
years, solidifying Israel’s role as a regional power.
After independence, the leaders of the new Jewish
state had a number of problems to solve. It was obvious
that the land claimed by the new state would not be
sufficient for its current population. Nor would it be
able to support the expected influx of Jewish immigrants.
Israel’s Zionist leadership had been conducting an active
campaign to encourage the Palestinians to move from their
homes since before World War II. This intensified during
the war of independence, which led to a massive outflow of
Palestinians. Once Jewish settlers moved into these
vacated areas, and with the Palestinians wanting to return
to their homes, Israel found itself with an internal
refugee problem with which it was unprepared to deal.
Israel had three choices. First, it could allow the
Palestinians to return and give them back their land.
Second, it could negotiate some kind of settlement,
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involving land resources Israel did not have. Finally,
Israel could leave the situation unresolved, by claiming to
still be under siege, thus relegating the Palestinians to
remaining refugees. The Israelis chose this last option,
leading Palestinians to seek a return to their homeland and
return of land by the Israelis, which they continue to want
today (Nasr, 1997).
The Palestinian refugee migration into southern
Lebanon directly impacted the Lebanese Shiites living
there. But the Shiites nonetheless remained sympathetic to
the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian refugee problem
taught the Shiites that fighting was the only way to keep
their land. Both Israel and the Palestinians had indicated
that the Shiite displacement would only be temporary. In
the end, the temporary Palestinian ordeal in Israel had
taught the Lebanese not to abandon their homes at any cost
and that confrontation was the only way to survive intact
(Jaber, 1997).
This Shiite confrontation would begin with the help of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Although
the secular PLO had gained some political legitimacy from
the United Nations in the early 1970s, their continued
harassment of Israeli settlements eventually pushed the
Israeli government to take decisive action. In 1982,
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon decided it was time to drive
the PLO from Israel’s northern border and launched
Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE in an attempt to destroy the
PLO once and for all. On October 16, 1982 an Israeli convoy
rolled through a Shiite crowd of 50,000 in the city of
Nabatiyeh, Lebanon. This gathering was being held to
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celebrate Ashura, the most sacred religious festival in
Shiite Islam. Instead of bypassing the town and avoiding a
confrontation, the Israeli convoy commander chose to roll
right through the celebration. The Muslims were furious at
the disregard for their holy day, while the Israelis
regarded the crowd reaction as a challenge to their
authority. A riot ensued and two Shiites were killed. The
Higher Shiite Council of Beirut issued a ‘Fatwa,’ or
religious edict, calling for confrontation against Israeli
forces. As a result of this call for jihad, the Hezbollah
organization was born (Jaber, 1997).
B. HEZBOLLAH
Hezbollah had begun as an informal resistance to
Israeli occupation and eventually developed into a very
complex psuedo-state at war with Israel. Although secrecy
still shrouds much of the inner workings of Hezbollah,
there has been enough information revealed over the years
to analyze at least some of Islam’s influence over the
organization’s purpose and goals.
In the early 1980’s, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah
organization was one of approximately twenty-five groups
fighting the Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli governments for
control of southern Lebanon. Islam’s influence over every
facet of the organization is what set Hezbollah apart from
its rivals. Using the Islamic revolution in Iran as a
blueprint, Hezbollah’s leadership focused on the Lebanese
Shiite Muslims as a foundation for their organization. The
often forgotten Shiite population benefited little during
Lebanon’s prosperous years. Now, with the country in
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chaos, the Shiite situation was hardly improving. Focusing
on Shiite religious convictions yielded Hezbollah immediate
results. First, religion was already a part of everyday
life. Therefore, the edicts put forth by the clerics would
be accepted as readily as any other religiously-oriented
prescriptions. Islam also gave the group an instant
infrastructure by which to build an organization. The
clerical hierarchy already in existence was considered
legitimate by worshipers, thus making the transition from a
religious entity to a theocracy relatively easy. Finally,
doing what was said to be religiously necessary provided
the ultimate motivation. As was seen in Iran a few years
earlier, the mood of the Lebanese masses was such that
southern Lebanon was ripe for revolution. Hezbollah now
had all of the elements in place to succeed in southern
Lebanon (Jaber, 1997).
In his piece entitled “The Moral Logic of Hezbollah,”
author Martin Kramer writes that Hezbollah differs from
other Lebanese militias in one fundamental regard.
Hezbollah’s leaders believe and espouse the idea of a
revolutionary vision for an Islamic state in Lebanon.
Hezbollah is not necessarily concerned about the future of
other groups fighting for survival in Lebanon. Rather, the
“Party of God” considers its version of Islam the only way
to save the country from the evils of the west, and to
provide the political and social stability that its
adherents believe has been missing (Kramer, 1998). In
contrast, terrorism expert David Rapoport notes that groups
like the Palestinian Liberation Organization have attempted
to do the same thing, but they have defined themselves from
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a secular rather than religious point of view (Rapoport,
1998).
By using Islam as the foundation of the new
organization, Hezbollah gained instant legitimacy from not
only the Lebanese Shiites, but other displaced Lebanese
minorities as well. Hezbollah’s list of goals (which
appear below) is general enough to benefit everyone, yet
specific enough to leave no doubt about what are
Hezbollah’s intentions.
Hezbollah Goals
• Liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation
• Inform the public of the continued Israeli aggression in
Lebanon and of the Israeli army's systematic killing of
civilians.
• Educate the public on the miserable living conditions of
the Lebanese people living under Israeli occupation.
• Improve the living condition of the Lebanese people
suffering under Israeli occupation.
• Provide assistance to families who lost their sources of
income due to Israeli Army attacks and assassinations.
• Resist the criminal and terrorist actions of the Israeli-
sponsored South Lebanese Army (SLA) terrorist organization.
• Provide housing to individuals whose homes were bombed by
the Israeli army.
• Provide low cost medical care
• Provide educational assistance to families in need
Source: www.moqwama.org
It is interesting to note that Islam is not
specifically mentioned in this list. Whether the Islamic
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influence is inferred or purposely left out, its presence
is readily apparent. Of course, there are drawbacks to
embracing a radical Islamic philosophy. As the Iranian and
Afghan people found out after their revolutions, radical
Islam completely changes the nature of a country. Although
Hezbollah is essentially an undeclared “state within a
state” it is still able to influence the population via
strong-arm tactics. Using Islamic law as a basis for its
legal system, Hezbollah tends to enforce its laws by direct
action. Much to the dismay of Muslims and non-Muslims
alike, Hezbollah supporters use terror tactics to enforce
the strict Islamic standards on issues such as alcohol
consumption and female dress codes (Jaber, 1997). Islamic
law is known for its efficiency when desired and its
hypocrisy when convenient, and its application in Lebanon
proves no exception. For example, although suicide is not
allowed according to the Koran, Hezbollah clerics have
skirted the issue by comparing the Hezbollah’s suicide
bombers to soldiers at war, thereby authorizing the use of
suicide tactics (Kramer, 1998). Yet, despite the perceived
shortcomings of the Islamic legal system, its acceptance by
Shiites is another proof of their recognition of
Hezbollah’s legitimacy. Also, although its version of
Islamic law could be considered extreme at times, Hezbollah
does provide a source of stability in an otherwise chaotic
environment.
As mentioned in Chapter II, Western military analysts
have long argued about the characteristics that a nation or
its military force must possess in order to succeed in war.
Without a decisive battle, or exchange of land or
resources, analysts must look to other areas to determine
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how the combatants fared during a conflict. For the
purpose of our three case studies, western military tools
of analysis will be used. These five keys to victory are
based on the writings of Sun Tzu. They are, again:
leadership, strategy, tactics, preparation (logistics and
technology), and desire. History has shown that a force
able to exploit its advantage in any of these areas may
have the edge on the battlefield.
1. Leadership
Hezbollah used both historical precedence and Islam to
set up its government infrastructure. Modeling itself
after the Iranian revolutionary government, Hezbollah’s
organization can be separated into two parts. The first is
made up of officials who hold positions in the hierarchy of
the organization, and the second consists of the masses.
As is the case in Iran, holy men who provide spiritual and
political guidance lead Hezbollah. While these clerics
have great influence over all issues, a council (or
‘Sharia’) and a Secretary-General make policy and legal
decisions. Both the Sharia and Secretary-General are
elected from within the established hierarchy (Jaber,
1997).
Initially, Hezbollah leadership relied heavily on the
religious clerics to form the backbone of its organization.
As the organization matured, however, Hezbollah gave its
military arm, Islamic Resistance, more autonomy in dealing
with day-to-day activities. This move toward centralized
command and decentralized execution for operations led to a
more effective fighting force in the early 1990’s. As a
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result, Islamic Resistance was able to carry out more
operations with greater results and fewer casualties
(Jaber, 1997).
While shrewd leadership has been critical to
Hezbollah’s success, its members come not only from
Lebanon, but the rest of the Muslim world as well. The
organization stresses the point that membership is not
limited to Lebanese and Palestinians. Indeed, Hezbollah
considers all Muslims members of the Party of God. This
open membership philosophy allows the organization to cross
national borders and expand its support base worldwide. It
also lends the group longevity, as its basic assumption
that any Muslim is a member guarantees followers as long as
the religion exists (Jaber, 1997). Whether this form of
leadership and government gives Hezbollah an advantage over
the democratically elected Israeli government is debatable.
However, the fact that Hezbollah is religiously based
definitely lends it an edge in rallying followers to its
cause.
2. Strategy
Although Judaism has played a significant role in
Israel’s development, Israeli national survival has been a
continuous goal since the state declared independence in
1948. After its successful 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the
Israeli government adopted two approaches as part of its
long-term strategy against terrorist organizations like
Hezbollah. By using air strikes and raids into southern
Lebanon, the Israelis felt they could curb the resistance
by eliminating Hezbollah’s leadership. The Israelis also
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believed that penalizing the population for any actions
committed by Hezbollah would turn the masses against the
freedom fighters. In both cases, their strategy did not
work. Jaber (1997) notes that the leaders who had been
targeted became martyrs and thus heroes to rally around,
and each Israeli reprisal only strengthened the
determination of the Lebanese Shiite to fight. Instead of
destroying Hezbollah’s will to win, the Israeli strategy
only boosted it. On the battlefield, Hezbollah’s long-term
harassment strategy included car bombs, suicide bombers,
rocket attacks, and small unit raids to provoke the
Israelis to respond. Then, a continuous propaganda
campaign exploited Israeli mistakes using all forms of
media available. Hezbollah’s goal was to not only make
Israel look bad, but to also portray Hezbollah’s own
fighters as waging war for a good cause. Not only did this
enhance Hezbollah’s legitimacy within Lebanon, but
furthered its cause with the outside world as well. The
Shiite clerics took an active role in singing Hezbollah’s
praises. Wherever a crowd gathered ― whether in mosques,
at funerals, or for festivals ― Hezbollah was able to get
its message out while Israeli responses continued to prove
the clerics’ criticisms of Israel correct (Jaber, 1997).
3. Tactics
As in most cases of asymmetric warfare, the
battlefield favors the defender. Not only does the
defender know the terrain, but he can also choose when and
where to fight. Because his aim is to throw the invader
out he also has an advantage in terms of the will to win.
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By definition, all of a defender’s assets and resources are
concentrated on defense. The attacker, on the other hand,
not only has to take the fight to the defender, but also
has to maintain support from home until victory has been
achieved. Defeating defensive tactics is often easier said
than done, as we saw in Vietnam and more recently in
Somalia. Even in Israel, local knowledge and popular
support in southern Lebanon have allowed Hezbollah
guerrillas to remain elusive despite the best Israeli
efforts to find and destroy them.
The most significant impact of a tactic in the Israel-
Hezbollah war has come in the form of the suicide bomber.
Although there are many historical examples of soldiers
knowingly committing suicide for their cause (the Japanese
kamikazes from World War II immediately come to mind),
Israelis were taken by complete surprise when the first
suicide attacks occurred in the early 1980s. The young men
carrying out these attacks seemed to represent a new breed
of freedom fighter. Born in poverty, with little hope for
the future, the recognition and accolades heaped on these
martyrs were too good for any young idealist to pass up.
Like the kamikaze attacking US warships, suicide bombers
were driven by the idea of defending their homeland and
were committed to the act by their belief in Islam, which
promises martyrs a pleasure-filled eternal life, at the
right hand of Allah.
4. Preparation
When comparing the technological and logistical
capabilities of Israel and Hezbollah, it certainly would
42
appear that Israel was better prepared for war. Backed by
US military and financial aid, there was little doubt that
when the conflict began in the early 1980s, Israel was one
of the premier fighting forces in the world.
In spite of the overwhelming odds facing Hezbollah,
however, the organization was able to build a respectable
force in a short period of time. Starting with a small
band of poorly equipped guerillas, and a combination of
Iranian money and training, and an active recruiting
campaign, Hezbollah developed into an efficient fighting
force. Recruiting success can be attributed to both socio-
economic and religious reasons. Having lived in chaos and
poverty for their entire lives, there is little economic or
educational opportunity for Lebanese youth, making the life
led by Islamic Resistance fighters very attractive. In
addition, answering the call to jihad by the religious
leadership brings prestige not only to the individual, but
to his family (Jaber, 1997).
Although membership in Hezbollah is universal and
automatic, becoming a member of Islamic Resistance is a
little more difficult, as new recruits have to pass through
a probationary period before they are considered for full
membership (Kramer, 1998). In 1986, militia membership was
estimated at nearly 4,000 men. After years of combat, and
considerable capital infusion from abroad, the Islamic
Resistance has become an ever larger, well-trained,
disciplined fighting force. In fact, Islamic Resistance
has improved so much that it has even begun to take on a
western military organizational style whereby specialized
units like artillery, signals, and engineers have been
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fielded. In addition, to tie all of these efforts
together, a general staff now exists to carry out the tasks
of running an army (Jaber, 1997).
Although, critics assert that Hezbollah could not
exist without the support of the Iranian government, this
is truer of Hezbollah in the past than today. Currently,
Hezbollah maintains a very complex fiscal arrangement.
Although it continues to accept ‘alms’ for support,
Hezbollah has a number of business enterprises and
investments to ensure that it can survive without any
external support. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah is actively
involved in large-scale business ventures such as
supermarkets, factories, and farms. It also provides low
cost housing to meet the needs of the displaced. Hezbollah
has even ventured into the international investment market
(Jaber, 1997).
Hezbollah has likewise matured over time, and evolved
on the ‘battlefield.’ The Hezbollah-Israeli war has been
characterized by small unit actions on each side. Western
style force-on-force battles never materialized as each
side attempted to capitalize on its strengths while
attacking the enemy’s weaknesses. For Hezbollah, what
began with “set and forget” bombs, ambushes and kidnappings
developed into complex, coordinated attacks against Israeli
forces in direct and indirect actions. Being the pre-
eminent military power in the Middle East, Israel’s arsenal
boasted modern western attack and surveillance aircraft.
However, the lessons learned by the US in Vietnam were
validated in Lebanon. The primary lesson learned had to do
with the will or desire of Hezbollah. Despite the fact
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that Israel could mass firepower with the best technology
available, simple “shoot, move and hide” tactics made it
nearly impossible for Israelis to locate and defeat their
determined indigenous foe (Jaber, 1997).
The technological imbalance of military equipment
between Israel and Hezbollah offers a classic example of
the inequities to be found in an asymmetric war. With
modern attack aircraft, like the US-made F-16 fighter-
bomber and Apache helicopter gunship, it appeared that
Israel would easily roll over any opposition. Technology
had already proven itself decisive on the modern
battlefield when US-led coalition forces soundly defeated
the Iraqis in Operation DESERT STORM. The obvious
difference between DESERT STORM and the Israelis’ actions
is that the coalition was fighting a conventional force
under conventional conditions while the Israeli-Hezbollah
war is an asymmetric fight. A better comparison might be
US operations in Vietnam some twenty years earlier, or the
Soviet debacle in Afghanistan.
Hezbollah’s firepower is a mix of old and new.
Despite fielding antique weaponry, Hezbollah has armed it
fighters with excellent terror weapons, like the Russian-
made Katyusha rocket, and has been able to maintain
harassment fire into northern Israel throughout this
campaign. Hezbollah military leader Sheikh Nabib Quarq
claimed by the 1990s that his organization possessed its
own state-of-the-art equipment that prevented Israel from
locating and defusing roadside bombs. He also claimed that
Hezbollah’s communications had become sophisticated enough
that they could not be jammed. Likewise, Hezbollah was
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able to field electronically controlled bombs that it
claimed could not be jammed or prematurely detonated
(Jaber, 1997).
Despite its use of smart bombs, modern artillery, and
other high tech equipment, Israel was unable to meet its
expectations of hitting targets without causing civilian
casualties. Hezbollah itself suffered 650 air raids and
was the target of 24,000 artillery shells, yet was still
firing salvos of Katyushas into northern Israel and at a
higher rate than when the offensive started in 1982 (Jaber,
1997). Technologically speaking, Israel may have seemed to
have the advantage, but as Arieh O’Sullivan, defense
analyst for the Jerusalem Post, pointed out,
Despite all its bravado and state-of-the-art
weapons systems, the IDF’s attempts to stop
Hezbollah from firing Katyushas into northern
Israel is like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito
in his teeth (Jaber, 1997, p. 178).
Ironically, for an ‘undeclared state’ less than
twenty-five years old, Hezbollah’s achievements are
impressive and reminiscent of Israel’s in its early stages.
Although it seems that Israel should have easily crushed
Hezbollah, it has been unable to eradicate the
organization, despite its best efforts. The question then
is, what other factors could be playing a role in
Hezbollah’s survival? The answer seems to be that
Hezbollah, like its predecessors in earlier asymmetric
wars, possesses a stronger desire or will to win. This
will to win should not be mistaken for a desire to survive.
The will to win we refer to is proactive rather than
reactive.
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C. HEZBOLLAH’S WILL TO WIN
This will to win may be impossible to quantify, but it
is very easy to locate. All we have to do is look at the
actions of the believers. For example, Jaber opens her
book HEZBOLLAH with the story of Hezbollah member Salah
Ghandour, a young man in his early twenties who was married
with three children. Ghandour had been active in the
Islamic Resistance for years, but in 1995 felt he had to do
more. In May of that year, he drove an explosives-laden
car into an Israeli convoy, killing himself and twelve
Israeli soldiers. His death came as no surprise to his
wife who initially pleaded with him to not go on the
mission. She eventually relented because she had always
known that this was his destiny. Despite her and her
children’s loss, she was “proud and filled with joy,”
because her husband believed that his death was the best
way he could defend and fight for his land and his
countrymen (Jaber, 1997).
The type of dedication demonstrated by Ghandour could
come from a number of things, but certainly testifies to
his strong sense of faith in Islam and acceptance of self-
sacrifice for the greater good. Khalil Jarradi, a local
theology teacher in the Lebanese village of Marrakeh, sums
up this motivation nicely,
It is faith. No one might believe us, but it
emanates from our faith ― that wondrous weapon,
which no armaments in the world can destroy,
united our town’s residents, despite the fact
that they belonged to different political parties
and affiliations before the invasion (Jaber,
1997, p. 23).
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Jarradi’s own teaching continually challenged Israel’s
presence in southern Lebanon, while his leadership inspired
many to the cause, and his success resulted in numerous
Israeli raids attempting to capture him. Though these
raids were unsuccessful, a bomb placed beneath his office
eventually did kill him. Yet, as so often has happened in
this conflict, though the Israelis may have killed the man
his influence continues, and they actually assisted in
turning him into a martyr for the resistance (Jaber, 1997).
While faith in Islam and commitment to the cause
appear to be the most significant elements in this desire
to win, Hezbollah’s ability to call on its members for
self-sacrifice is extraordinary. The idea of self-
sacrifice is instilled at an early age even though
Hezbollah admits that children cannot comprehend martyrdom.
Through their study of religion, children learn that
paradise is their reward for death in battle. To
strengthen this point, the actions of martyrs dying for the
cause are glorified in pictures, speeches, and poems. As
one member of the Hezbollah Women’s Association put it,
“…self-sacrifice…is as normal as being taught in childhood
that stealing is a sin” (Jaber, 1997, p. 90).
While it is difficult to provide tangible proof that
the will to win exists, there is evidence that an
organization gains when using religion as a motivator for
war. Although there have been many stories and eyewitness
accounts attesting to the faith and dedication of
believers, there is still no proof, other than deliberate
acts of self-sacrifice, that Islam itself is a motivator.
But, throughout this case study, the effect that Islam has
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had on the commitment, legitimacy, longevity, and
membership of Hezbollah should be more than apparent.
In addition to these factors, Hezbollah has been able
to succeed because it has been able to focus its energy on
a common enemy, Israel. Hezbollah’s hatred for the state
of Israel is unyielding and, according to its manifesto,
the organization will never have anything resembling normal
relations with that country. This feeling stems largely
from the fact that Israel exists on what is considered to
be Muslim land. As a result, the ‘war’ between Hezbollah
and Israel cannot end until Israel ceases to exist
altogether (Jaber, 1997).
As with hatred, Hezbollah’s most important resource ―
people ― is virtually unlimited. This, combined with its
ability to motivate its followers to action through the
will to win, renders Hezbollah a difficult opponent.
Israel’s strategy for protecting its northern border,
though admirable, only adds to the problem. Israel’s
aggressive action taken to eliminate terrorists only
inspires more recruits and steels their resolve. As long
as both sides pursue their current agendas, the battle will
never be won and the conflict will continue. Over the long
term, this stalemate could spell defeat for Israel, the
stronger power.
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V. CASE STUDY #2: FIS AND ALGERIA
Nationalism is still today a powerful force in world
politics and a critical cohesive element presently used by
countries around the world. According to US historian John
Lukas (1990), “All the isms are wasms ― except one, the
most powerful ism of this century, indeed, of the entire
democratic age, which is nationalism” (p. 41). This means
that nationalism endures, while colonialism, expansionism,
and imperialism, for example, are no longer relevant in
today’s political arena. However, one ‘ism’ remerging in
the 21st century is fundamentalism. Fundamentalism, of
course, is not really new, while its appeal to the masses
is not entirely different from that of nationalism (Peters,
1993).
E. J. Hobsbawm (1987) defines nationalism as “the
readiness of people to identify themselves emotionally with
‘their’ nation” (p. 143). Nationalism can also be defined
as a devotion to the interests or culture of a particular
people. Fundamentalism, meanwhile, is an assertion or a
re-assertion of traditional beliefs and practices
associated with a particular religion. The connection
between religious fundamentalism and nationalism is obvious
if the traditional religious beliefs and practices
represent a people’s way of life or culture. This is true,
for instance, in Algeria. “As during the preceding
centuries, Islam was the strongest binding force in a
highly heterogeneous country plagued by constant tribal and
family feuding; under foreign, non-Muslim influence this
became even more prevalent” (Stone, 1997, p. 146).
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A. BACKGROUND
Fundamentalism, in a nearly religiously homogeneous
society, can work to unite people and bridge fissures much
the way nationalism did in Algeria in 1962. Ninety-nine
percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. But, Algeria,
not unlike other African countries, is diverse and full of
overlapping fissures that divide or could potentially
divide the country. Ethnically, Algeria is 80% Arab and
20% Berber. The common spoken languages are Arabic,
Berber, and French. Geographically, 4/5 of the country is
desert and most of the habitable terrain is along the
Mediterranean coast. Therefore, most cities are along the
coast. Over half of the population lives in cities and,
subsequently, most of the population is located in the
northern portion of the country. Generational cleavages
are important because 70% of Algerians are under 30 years
of age (Metz, 1994).
Events of the last 30 years have led to sharp
distinctions between older Algerians who experienced
liberation from France, middle-aged Algerians who grew up
in the liberated state and currently run the country, and
young Algerians who only know of the current government and
its failures.
More immediately, fundamentalism flows from the
belief that the nationalist leaders who led their
countries to independence after World War II did
not deliver to most people the better lives they
promised; they and their foreign ideologies had
failed. This perception of failure cut to a
considerable extent along generation lines. As
older people rested on the laurels of victories
past, younger people were looking for victories
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over present problems which their elders seemed
unable or unwilling to produce. Their
dissatisfaction was reinforced by the fact that
slow economic growth limited their upward
mobility. Those who had made and profited from
the revolution could not now make room for their
own children, or at least for the children of
those who had not profited. Unemployment,
underemployment, and inappropriate employment
were greatest among the young, most of whom
ironically now boasted better educations than
their parents (Ruedy, 1992, p. 241).
Lastly, of course, economic fissures are also present in
Algeria. The important point here is that all these
fissures overlap and that most of these fissures were
buried or ignored during the National Liberation Front’s
(FLN) long and heroic struggle for Algerian independence.
1. National Liberation Front (FLN)
Berbers are the indigenous people of Algeria.
However, numerous invaders throughout history have affected
them. The Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs,
Turks, and the French have influenced Algeria. The
greatest pressure came during the Arab conquest of North
Africa, which ushered in the spread of Islam. This is when
Berbers converted to Islam and formed an Islamic government
during the 8th century. Islam thus has a long history in
the region, which is important for understanding just how
deeply its roots extend into Algerian culture.
France invaded Algiers in 1830 and shortly thereafter
annexed Algeria. The French controlled Algeria for more
than 130 years. Although Algerians were French subjects,
they were always considered lesser. Algerians could become
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French citizens only if they renounced Islam and converted
to Christianity. Obviously, this stipulation, combined
with continuous French exploitation, instigated popular
resistance. Initially, Algerians only wanted equal rights
and status, but eventually they sought complete autonomy
(Stone, 1997).
After World War II, the French tried to compromise
with the Muslims in Algeria, but by then it was too late.
Algerian nationalism, along with worldwide Arab
nationalism, was growing and a fight for independence
seemed inevitable. Ahmed Ben Bella, along with several
other exiled Algerians, created the FLN in Egypt. On 1
November 1954, the FLN officially began what quickly
developed into a ruthless guerilla war against the French.
This eight-year campaign against France marks the epitome
of Algerian unity. The Evian Accords, on 18 March 1962,
ushered in a cease-fire and the end of over a century of
French rule in Algeria (Stone, 1997).
The FLN was victorious in winning independence and in
unifying a people divided by numerous fissures. These
fissures have since resurfaced. The less the FLN has
proved able to accomplish its original purpose, the less
unified the country has become. “The avowed purpose of the
FLN was ‘the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and
social, Algerian state within the framework of Islamic
principles’” (Roberts, 1988, p. 558). Algeria won its
independence on July 1, 1962 and operated as a socialist
state from 1963 through 1989. The FLN used religion to
assist in the unification of the people and to achieve its
goals. “It mobilized the Islamic element of Algerian
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culture in order to establish itself as a popular movement,
but this mobilization was instrumental rather than
expressive of the spirit of the movement” (Roberts, 1988,
p. 588). Ironically, much as the FLN used but did not
treat religion seriously, favoring nationalism instead, the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) now wields fundamentalism in
nationalism’s place.
2. Islamic Salvation Front
The FIS emerged in February 1989 primarily because the
FLN and the government had failed to understand the needs
of the people. “Islamism had little difficulty in
connecting with social distress, for it involved itself
precisely where the vacuum and the attendant need were
experienced most severely” (Malley, 1996, p. 242). This
connection and understanding is critical to FIS’s use of
religion to motivate the Algerian people. At first glance,
appearances might lead one to believe that the FIS was
destined to be successful and that Algerians would
peacefully unite. Unfortunately, for two reasons, this has
not and is not likely to happen. First, the military
(originally FLN-supported) assumed power and is reluctant
to relinquish control. Second, although in step with
Algerian society, the FIS does not have a plan for running
the country and wants nothing less than an Islamic state.
“The strength of their appeal came from their moral stance,
not from the realism of their plans for the future” (Pierre
& Quandt, 1996, p. 13). The FIS slogan of ‘Islam is the
solution’ does not in itself solve the problems of Algeria.
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a. Strategy and Tactics
The 12-year-old asymmetric conflict between the
Algerian government and the FIS is currently stalemated.
A final scenario involves a prolongation of the
present situation in which the junta is unable to
reach out to other parties or even dominate the
country militarily and suppress the Islamists,
nor are the Islamists able to dislodge the
military hold on the basic instruments of power
(Fuller, 1996, p. 110).
The failure by both forces to consistently apply strategy,
tactics, leadership, preparation, and desire ― all of Sun
Tzu’s principles for victory ― explains the stalemate.
Although both the government and the FIS receive poor marks
in strategy and tactics, the FIS’s marks are worse. By
engaging in killings, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings,
and general terrorism, they have alienated parts of the
population in their effort to undermine the government.
“During the last three years, the Islamists have become so
vicious, destructive, splintered and out of control that it
is unlikely Algerians or the international community would
allow them to govern” (St. John, 1996, p. 8). As Professor
Peter St. John indicates, the FIS’s current strategy and
tactics are extremely unpopular. Although this makes it
unlikely the FIS will govern in its present form, it could
conceivably rule if it delegated and stuck to a clearly
defined strategic plan.
b. Leadership and Preparation
The Algerian government has the advantage over
the FIS in both leadership and preparation. The FLN
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emerged from its war of independence with France having
learned the benefits of capable leadership and thorough
preparation. The current regime capitalized on this FLN
experience. The FIS leadership, on the other hand, has
struggled to stay out of jail and to remain alive. The
resources, funds, and trading possibilities of the Algerian
government far exceed the capabilities of the FIS, to
include all available external support. FIS logistics,
technology, and training cannot be compared to those of
even a marginal nation-state. All told, the government has
the advantage in four out of five of Sun Tzu’s principles:
strategy, tactics, leadership, and preparation.
Given the government’s apparent superiority the
question is, why is there a stalemate? The short answer
is, the weaker force can win simply by not losing. Sun
Tzu’s last principle, desire ― the hardest to measure ― is
clearly the equalizer in this case. Simply put, members of
the FIS apparently have a greater will to win than do their
government opponents. The Islamists are motivated to do
whatever it takes, for as long as is necessary to achieve
victory. This motivation represents the FIS’s strength and
highlights the current government’s weakness. Unless the
government can focus on overcoming this weakness, thereby
undermining the FIS’s strength, the best that the
government can hope for remains a stalemate.
B. RELIGION MOTIVATES THE PEOPLE
“The question then is not so much whether the FIS will
come to power, but how, and to what degree” (Fuller, 1996,
p. xviii). Appropriateness, identity, rationality, and its
57
internally consistent logic lend religion the tremendous
motivational force. The FIS uses Islam and these four
factors to motivate its followers and supporters, and
infuse them with the will to win. In time, this desire to
win may eventually bring the FIS to power.
Historically, the typical Algerian has been described
as more pragmatic than pure. The failure of socialism by
the 1980s, combined with persistent nationwide economic
difficulties, set the stage for the turbulent 1990s.
“Islamism offered comforting social norms ― dress codes,
ritualized prayers ― and a sense of collective purpose to
young disaffected, and marginalized Algerians in desperate
search of both” (Malley, 1996, p. 243). Preference-based
decisions and cost-benefit analyses, which never seemed to
lead to success, sent individuals searching for answers in
other places. Rational individuals, who consciously sought
to make plans and decisions for their future, were bound to
be frustrated by the government’s failings and its
unconvincing explanations. By offering a philosophy based
on the logic of appropriateness, as well as rules, and a
social structure, Islam presented an appealing alternative
to many Algerians.
At the same time, Islam offered Algerians an identity.
This religious identity may actually be the most powerful
component of Algerian culture.
Apart from tiny residual Christian and Jewish
communities in Algiers and other northern cities,
nearly all Algerians are Muslims. But this
apparent homogeneity belies the enormous
geographical, linguistic, ethnic, and other local
divisions among Algerians; indeed, one of the
central themes of successive Algerian regimes
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since 1962 has been the goal of forging a
‘national’ identity as a means of overcoming the
profound problems caused by these cleavages
(Stone, 1997, p. 7).
Algeria has long struggled to find something that appeals
to people beyond their family or tribe, and Islam would
appear to be the one thing that people already share in
common.
Algeria’s linguistic difficulties epitomize the
country’s struggle for identity. The region’s indigenous
language is Berber, but was replaced by Arabic following
the Arab conquest in the seventh and eighth centuries.
During the one hundred years of French rule, French became
the language of commerce and education. However, the
country remained predominantly Islamic and the Koran
continues to be written in Arabic. Arabic is necessary for
reading and understanding the Koran, which automatically
creates a sense of identity among believers. Following
independence, the government’s “goal was a country where
the language (Arabic), religion (Islam), and national
identity (Algerian) were free, as far as practical, of
French language and influence” (Metz, 1994, p. 88). This
Arabisation policy began in the 1970s and, inadvertently,
helped fuel inter-generational tensions in Algeria. In
many cases, the younger generation only spoke Arabic, while
many of the scarce employment opportunities available to
the Algerian youth still required knowledge of French.
The Arabisation of public administration and the
state sector of the economy did not keep pace
with that of secondary and higher education, with
the result that by the mid- to late 1970s there
were large numbers of young Algerians educated in
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Arabic for whom employment opportunities were
scarce (Roberts, 1988, p. 566).
These increasingly large numbers of disenfranchised male
youth amounted to a ready-made membership for FIS.
Unemployed and under-employed young men lent backbone and
strength to the FIS. Islam not only helped refocus youth,
but also offered them a collective purpose. Actually,
disgruntled Algerians of all ages found themselves
attracted to Islam. Although evidence does not suggest
that the FIS consciously used Islam to motivate its
followers, the fact that the FIS was Islamic did appeal to
people.
C. THE WILL TO WIN AND THE FIS
Faith can be considered an enabling factor, if not the
critical element, in the will to win, and can thus be
considered instrumental in contributing to victory on the
battlefield. The will to win cannot be described in
tangible terms, as can the other four benefits gained by
the FIS ― commitment, legitimacy, membership, and
longevity. As previously discussed, commitment,
legitimacy, and membership taken together are directly
responsible for establishing longevity, and for securing an
organization’s long-term survival. Islam’s perseverance in
Algeria is beyond dispute ― it has been there since the
900s ― the FIS has endured for over a decade, and is still
active.
While Islam has never truly been a pacifist creed, the
FIS’s original goal was not to engage in a military
struggle with the Algerian government.
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The FIS reversion to armed violence in January
1992 sprang directly from the army’s coup, its
annulment of the FIS national election victory of
the previous month, its rejection of FIS
activists who sought peaceful means to power, the
subsequent arrest of hundreds of FIS leaders,
including its top leadership, and the outright
banning of the party (Fuller, 1996, p. 37).
Islam inspires ultimate commitment, but this commitment is
not necessarily violent or peaceful. In Algeria, the FIS’s
Islamist bent, combined with its desire for radical
political change, led to acts of extremism. However, in
most cases, FIS’s supporters were not committed to
violence, but rather to their religion. All FIS really
sought was support so that it could apply pressure on the
government to change its ways.
The FIS continues to pursue the goal of an Islamic
state. According to author Hugh Roberts (1988), “An
Islamic state is a state governed in accordance with
Islamic law, the Sharia” (p. 558). The Sharia is a set of
laws derived from the Koran. The fact that Muslims believe
that their ultimate spiritual guidance comes from the
Koran, amounts to an internally consistent logic because
the Koran is also said to be beyond question. Therefore,
an Islamic state will be legitimate as long as it follows
the Sharia. The pursuit of this has itself lent the FIS
legitimacy. But the FIS has also gained legitimacy because
it picked up where the FLN failed. The FLN promised, but
did not produce, an Algerian state based on Islamic
principles.
Meanwhile, the FIS is able to use its religious base
to increase its membership. As nearly all Algerians are
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Muslims, FIS’s potential membership includes most
Algerians. Nothing is as all-encompassing as religion is
in Algeria when it comes to bridging fissures based on
ethnic, linguistic, generational, economic, or regional
differences. Altogether, the FIS appeals to a wide range
of people, the most influential groups of whom include
youth, militant Islamists, veterans from Afghanistan and
the Gulf War, deserters from the Algerian army, the
economically challenged, and anyone else who was adversely
affected by colonialism or the failure of the Algerian
government. As a result, the FIS can recruit from an
enormous population base that excludes, arguably, only
members of the ruling elite (Fuller, 1996). More to the
point still, the FIS has an inexhaustible pool from which
to recruit members. This alone guarantees it a future.
Presently, the FIS has not yet achieved a complete
victory, and conflict in Algeria continues. However, by
not having lost, the FIS has achieved a victory of sorts.
The fact that it has not been defeated seems improbable
because analysis indicates that the government holds most
of the advantages. The only advantage held by the FIS is,
presumably, its will to win. This otherwise invisible
attribute manifests itself as commitment, legitimacy,
membership, and longevity. And it is ultimately these
factors that may yet enable the FIS to achieve total
victory over the government.
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VI. CASE STUDY #3: IRAN AND IRAQ
In recent years the influence of the superpowers on
political and military agendas has diminished, but many
countries continue to be torn apart by internal violence.
In some cases, religious differences have played a
significant role. However, religious conflict cannot
always be defined in the traditional terms of one religion
fighting another. The conflict among people of the same
religion is often just as generative of violence as is
conflict between people of different religions. For
example, the two major sects of Islam ― Sunni and Shiite ―
have continually been at odds over which one represents
true Islam. We see just how bloody an interfaith war can
be in the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), where the
Islamic religion played a role in motivating the forces on
both sides.
This multi-faceted war was one of the few conventional
conflicts fought during the Cold War era. It was a war
fought over religious issues, border disputes, and
political differences, and was fueled by ancient
Shiite/Sunni and Persian/Arab cleavages as well as the
personality clash between Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam
Husayn (Pike, 1999). As in the previous case studies, the
Iran-Iraq War will be analyzed using five principles for
victory derived from the writings of Chinese philosopher
Sun Tzu. In terms of leadership, strategy, tactics, and
preparation, the war was an asymmetric conflict that
favored Iraq. Yet, in the final analysis, historians
define the outcome of the war as a draw with heavy losses
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on both sides. The question is, how were the Iranians able
to fight to a draw when they were clearly outmatched? Was
it simply that the Iranians were more committed to victory?
The desire or will to win is the fifth principle for
victory, and appears to have played the most significant
role in this conflict. But was this desire to win
religiously motivated, or was nationalism the fuel? ― that
is the question this chapter attempts to answer.
A. BACKGROUND
While some historians call the Iran-Iraq War the
longest conventional war in the last one hundred years,
other historians treat the war as the latest round of
Persian-Arab hostilities. Although the reasons for the
1980 invasion by Iraq are complicated as well as numerous,
some analysts believe that Husayn launched the Iraqi
invasion for only two reasons. First, there was the open
hostility between Husayn and his Iranian counterpart,
Khomeini. With Khomeini’s revolution less than two years
old, the economic and political chaos that existed in Iran,
exacerbated by a war, could lead to the downfall of the new
Islamic regime and eliminate one of Husayn’s regional
enemies (Hiro, 1991). Husayn’s second reason to invade
Iran was based on his fear that the Shiite population in
Iraq might be inspired by the success of the Iranian
revolution to overthrow his government. Crushing the
Iranian Shiite regime would then keep the Iraqi Shiite
under control. While Middle East expert Daniel Pipes
acknowledges that both of these explanations have merit, he
proposes that Husayn invaded Iran for less complex reasons.
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Pipes theorizes that the Iraqi invasion was inspired by
border disputes that had been simmering for years. The
boundary at the Shatt al-‘Arab River, which separates the
two countries, was at the center of the controversy (Pipes,
1983).
In 1975, the Shah of Iran and then ― Iraqi Vice
President Husayn signed the Algiers Accords. As a result
of the Accords, both sides compromised and determined where
the national boundaries would lie along the Shatt al-‘Arab
river. In the end, Iraq gained some territory while Iran
was granted the access to the Shatt al-‘Arab it desired.
On the surface, both sides seemed satisfied with the deal,
though it appeared that Iran had negotiated better terms
(Hiro, 1991).
The four years following the Algiers Accords were
filled with internal conflict in both Iran and Iraq. In
Iraq, concerns over the Shiite Islamic revival and the
threat it posed to the secular Baath party led to the
election of the hardliner Husayn as president. While his
predecessor, President Bakr, took a conciliatory approach
to the Shiite problem, Husayn advocated tough tactics
against Iraq’s religious majority. Committed to the
western notion of the separation of church and state, the
Baath party and its leadership had a reasonable fear of a
possible Shiite uprising (Hiro, 1991). Since Islamic
fundamentalism had led to the Shah’s overthrow, and with
such a large Shiite population in southern Iraq, it was
reasonable to believe that a religiously motivated uprising
could also occur in Iraq.
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Whereas the Iraqis’ fear of religiously inspired
revolution encouraged their invasion of Iran, the Iranians
looked upon their religiously motivated revolution as a
source of strength throughout the war. While a number of
reasons for the Shah’s demise have been identified,
religion ― in this case Shiite Islam ― played a significant
role. The Ayatollah Khomeini had been a critic of the Shah
and his western-influenced government for some time.
Khomeini had been jailed and deported a number of times for
his outspoken protests against the monarchy. Ultimately,
the popular Islamic fundamentalist movement led by Khomeini
toppled the monarchy and redefined the entire country
(Hiro, 1991). For Khomeini, the war could not have come at
a better time. With the Islamic regime less than a few
years old, it needed events to rally around to solidify its
power. The American hostage crisis provided one such
source at the beginning of the revolution, and the Iraqi
invasion gave the Mullahs plenty of material for their
fiery sermons that further energized the masses (Workman,
1994).
There were several factors, meanwhile, which
encouraged Husayn to finally invade. First, Iran seemed to
be an easy target. At the time, the new Revolutionary
Regime was trying to deal with the problems of running a
country. Iran’s unemployment was high and its oil revenues
were low, while the Kurds and other groups continued to
rebel against the government. Also, the Iranian military
had been decimated by purges while its equipment had fallen
into disrepair. Second, the fall weather was favorable for
infantry and armor operations in that part of the world.
Finally, the most important factor was that the
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superpowers’ attentions were focused elsewhere. The
Soviets had their own problems in Afghanistan and Poland,
while the Americans were preoccupied with the upcoming
presidential elections and a potential Cold War
confrontation in Afghanistan. Also, judging from the
recent US experience with Iran, Husayn must have assumed
that the US would not be upset by the demise of the Iranian
government (Pipes, 1983).
The success of the initial Iraqi ground assault, in
September 1980, led analysts to believe that Husayn’s
prediction of a quick victory might come true. The
combined arms assault against the disorganized Iranian
government and military looked like a one-sided battle.
Surprisingly though, the Iranians were able to quickly
mount a defense and the Iraqi attack lost momentum. In
1982, the Iranian counterattack rapidly moved through Iraqi
lines, prodding Husayn to propose the withdrawal of Iraqi
forces in the hopes that Iran would agree to end the war.
Iran, with momentum on its side, refused to accept the
terms and continued the war into Iraq. By the beginning of
1984, Iraq had formally changed its war aims from conquest
of Iranian territory to stopping Iranian forces from
further gains. In April, Husayn proposed another
diplomatic settlement, which was again rejected (Pike,
1999). By the end of 1984, human wave assaults and other
wasteful tactics had taken their toll, and the casualty
totals were horrendous. By 1985, both sides changed
strategies as cities and industrial areas were targeted by
air strikes, artillery barrages and missile attacks.
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was officially noted during
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this time, but their overall effects were insignificant
(Hiro, 1991).
Oil, the lifeblood of both countries, had strategic
implications throughout the war as its revenues helped
finance the war effort. The new attacks on shipping
brought the superpowers into the war when both the USSR and
the US provided tankers to Kuwait to ensure the flow of
oil. By 1988, the Persian Gulf was the center of naval
operations for ten western and eight regional navies (Hiro,
1991). In 1988 UN Resolution 598 was passed, officially
marking the end of the war. With the exception of huge
losses in men and material, little of note had come out of
the eight-year conflict.
B. THE WILL TO WIN IN AN ASYMMETRIC WAR
Determining the military significance of the war is
difficult. Without a decisive battle or exchange of land
or resources, analysts must look to other areas to
determine how the combatants fared during the war. The
principles for victory will again be used to determine
which side had the advantage during the war.
1. Leadership
The effect of leadership on the outcome of the Iran-
Iraq War can be evaluated on many levels. National
leadership obviously played a significant role in the
conduct of the war, but the military leadership also
influenced the war’s outcome. Much has been written about
the leadership styles of Husayn and Khomeini. Throughout
the war, Husayn’s actions were in line with the secular
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nature of the ruling Baath party, although he did not
hesitate to use religious symbolism when it served his
purposes. Khomeini, on the other hand, used religion as
the basic motivator for the revolution and the war. With
both leaders playing to their respective strengths, neither
side had a leadership advantage at the national level.
Author Dilip Hiro (1991) explains,
Both [Husayn and Khomeini] were strong willed,
intransigent men, who could not be intimidated,
they believed absolutely in themselves and their
doctrines. But their experiences were poles
apart, and they ran different types of regimes.
Khomeini had every reason to be confident of his
inspirational charisma…. In contrast, Husayn was
in charge of a well-oiled state and party
machines, which were awash with money and
confidence (p. 37).
The military leadership on both sides was marked by
highs and lows. Despite having modern equipment,
professional military training, and access to some of the
Cold War’s best advisors, neither side was able to make
lasting military headway. For Iraq, much of the blame can
be placed on Husayn. Although a self-proclaimed Field
Marshal, Husayn had little military training and relied on
his faithful lieutenants to carry out orders. Husayn’s
concerns about coup attempts ensured that capable combat
commanders did not rise too high in rank. Even those Iraqi
commanders who proved their worth during the first months
of the war were unable to maintain momentum on the
battlefield. The Iraqi war machine stalled because
Husayn’s centralized command policies made it difficult to
exploit any advantages, and the logistical shortcomings of
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the Iraqi army made sustained operations impossible (Hiro,
1999).
Iranian military problems also emanated from on high.
The difference between the two countries was that in Iran’s
case its leadership was religious. The Revolutionary
regime had purged its best officers during the revolution
to ensure that a coup would not take place. Distrust of
the professional military placed the new government in a
difficult situation. The government needed experienced
combat commanders and staff officers to make the armed
forces run; yet, it did not trust officers’ loyalties. As
the war progressed, command eventually passed from the
interim military leaders to the clergy. Under this new
leadership scheme, positive results were immediately
evident. In March 1982, the clerics launched Operation
UNDENIABLE VICTORY to penetrate Iraqi lines and split Iraqi
forces in the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan. This
was the turning point of the war as Iran took the offensive
for the first time (Pike, 1999). As the war continued
though, the lack of formal training became an advantage “…
as the Iranian field commanders, unburdened by over-
centralized control and unaffected by the traditional
military staff college training, manifested themselves in
innovation and ingenuity in the midst of battle” (Hiro,
1991, p. 51). It appears that neither side gained an
advantage from its leadership. Fortunately, their mistakes




Iraq’s war strategy can be described as complex,
ambitious, and inconsistent, all of which led to the high
number of casualties and no significant gains. Hiro
describes Iraq’s war plans as being both offensive and
defensive in nature. On the northern and central fronts,
Iraq’s planners developed a defensive posture to prevent
Iran from moving through the oilfields of the Mesopotamian
plain and on to Baghdad. In the south, Iraq’s offensive
strategy was designed to liberate Khuzestan. The strategy
changed after the Iranian counter-attack. The Iraqis’ goal
changed from offensive warfare to defending against the
Iranian attacks. Still later, their strategy changed again
and evolved into pushing the Iranians back across the
border (Hiro, 1991).
The Iranian strategy was simple through the first
months of the war, as Iran had no choice but to fight a
defensive campaign. Once its forces were healthy enough,
Iran counter-attacked and began pushing Iraqi forces back
across the border. Despite Iraqi overtures for a truce,
Khomeini considered the Iranian counter-attack critical to
attaining what was quickly becoming his ultimate goal, the
downfall of the Iraqi government. There was little doubt
that religion provided some of the motivation for the
Iranian war plans. Destruction of the Iraqi government
would not only free up access to Shiite holy sites in Iraq,
but also rid Iraq of secular influences, allowing for a
more appropriate Islamic-based government to take over.
Strategically, Husayn was unrealistic in his expectations
of eliminating the Iranian government. Iran’s war plans,
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on the other hand, not only appeared to be reactionary in
nature, but also simple, given Khomeini’s goal of toppling
Iraq’s government.
3. Tactics
Tactically speaking both sides adapted to the
battlefield, using historical precedence and religious
motivation when the circumstances dictated. Taking a
lesson from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Iraqis attempted
to destroy the Iranian Air Force on the ground with a
surprise attack on the opening day of the war. Although
the attack inflicted some damage, the Iranians were able to
launch counter-attacks later that day. As the war dragged
on, it became obvious that Iraqi forces were incapable of a
sustained offensive because of the lack of tactical skill,
motivation, and logistical support. Instead, the Iraqis
fell back to a Soviet-style static defense to prevent
further Iranian gains (Hiro, 1991).
The Iranians, although well equipped, lacked the spare
parts to take advantage of the large military build-up
initiated by the Shah. They based their most successful
tactics instead on their greatest resource, people. These
“human wave” assaults consisted of formations of about one
thousand men, each armed with a shoulder fired rocket
launcher. These formations, spread out at 200-500 yard
intervals, strained the Iraqi defenses and eventually
overwhelmed them. Without religion and the promise of
martyrdom to motivate the troops, these human wave tactics
could never have been used (Hiro, 1991).
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Both sides learned their tactical lessons the hard
way. Innovation and ingenuity eventually found their way
on to the battlefield, but in the end Iraq maintained the
overall tactical advantage.
4. Preparation
In terms of being prepared for battle, Iraq with its
large, well-equipped war machine definitely had the
advantage over Iran, which was still trying to deal with
post-revolution chaos. One weakness that both sides shared
was the inability to carry the fight to the enemy and
sustain the attack. Although each side attacked into the
other’s territory, with air strikes, long-range artillery
barrages, and surface-to-surface missile attacks, the
ground war moved less than fifty miles on either side of
the border. There may have been political reasons in each
country for not expanding the front, but the bottom line
was that neither country had the logistical capability to
effectively move men, ammunition, and supplies forward.
Hiro notes that on a number of occasions, Iran was unable
to gain the tactical advantage due to “long supply lines…
and inadequate logistical backing” (Hiro, 1991, p. 87).
Iraq fared no better. Its forces performed well as long as
they were near their own border, but lacked the motivation
to operate deep inside Iraq as their communications and
supply lines were overstretched (Hiro, 1991).
In terms of technology, the Iran-Iraq War was the
latest conflict to be a testing ground for the superpowers.
Analyst Anthony Cordesman notes that Iraq’s technological
superiority countered Iran’s manpower superiority. But, in
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the early 1970’s, Iran had benefited from generous US
weapons sales policies and from the presence of US
advisors. Early in the war, US-trained airmen and F-4
Phantom fighter-bombers comprised the only counter-attack
capability Iran had against the Iraqi onslaught. Later,
critical items like HAWK air defense missile batteries and
TOW anti-tank missiles made it through the arms embargo and
improved Iran’s offensive and defensive capabilities
(Cordesman, 1987).
Iraq was able to continue to arm itself throughout the
war, using its oil resources to fund its weapons purchases.
Supplied by a number of countries including France and the
Soviet Union, modern weapons such as T-62 tanks, Mirage and
MiG fighter-bombers, and Exocet anti-ship missiles gave the
edge to the Iraqis in the realm of technology. With the
exception of the Exocet attacks on Gulf shipping, though,
the Iraqis seemed to have difficulty in effectively
employing these modern weapons. Husayn’s dictatorial rule
and military incompetence probably led to Iraq’s failure in
this area. The Exocet did add a new dimension to the war.
For the first time since World War II, “neutral shipping”
was attacked in order to expand the scope of the war.
Also, the nature of long-range artillery duels changed when
each side began using short-range ballistic missiles to
attack population and industrial centers (Hiro, 1991). In
the end, technology made the war more deadly for all of the
participants, but because it had better access to
equipment, Iraq retained a significant advantage. Yet, if
Iraq’s technological capabilities were so much better, why
did it not win a decisive victory?
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Having reviewed four of the five principles for
victory, it appears that Iraq possessed the overall
advantage. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, Iran was
able to respond and turn the war into a stalemate that
dragged on for seven more years. The difference between
the two countries was that Iran seemed to have a stronger
desire or will to win. This is not to say that Iraq
completely rolled over for the Iranians. Once the battle
was being fought on their native soil, the Iraqis stepped
up and fought defensively with an enthusiasm not seen since
the opening days of the war. The question then is, what
could have inspired either side to fight a war whose only
political or military significance was the tremendous loss
of human life? The answer lies in the appetite each side
had for fighting and for continuing to fight. In
retrospect, it appears that age-old rivalries, animosities,
religious differences, and nationalism combined to motivate
each side to wage this war.
C. RELIGION MOTIVATES THE MASSES
Religion has been used throughout history as a
motivator for war and violence. Typically, hostilities pit
one religion against another. For example, western European
crusaders marched on the Holy Land to free the area from
the Muslims. But sometimes the fight occurs within the
same religion, between two different sects.
Although Westerners often think of Islam as a single
unified religion, this is, in fact, not the case. Islam’s
major dividing line splits the Shiite and Sunni sects, and
though both groups espouse the same basic beliefs, there
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are some fundamental differences that frequently lead to
conflict. The main difference between the two sects
revolves around the Imamate, or leadership aspects, of the
religion (Metz, 1987). The Sunnis believe that religious
and political leaders can be chosen or elected by the
faithful. The Shiites believe that only God, can appoint
the leadership. For the Shiites, any denial of a prophet
would be denying a messenger of God and is therefore
unacceptable (Ali Abbas, 2001). Sunnis and Shiites share
five of Islam’s Seven Pillars of Faith. The two pillars
not shared by the Sunnis are jihad and the requirement for
Muslims to do good work and avoid all evil. Shiites
recognize Sunnis as fellow Muslims, but consider the Sunni
sect to be incomplete when compared to their own (Metz,
1987).
At first glance, the Iran-Iraq War appears to be a war
involving religious beliefs and is yet another chapter in
the struggle between Shiite and Sunni Islam. Upon review
of the post-war literature though, the war can be more
accurately described as a conflict fueled by nationalist
ideals as well as by religion.
Throughout its fifty-year reign, the Pahlavi monarchy
pushed to westernize the Persian Empire. Although pursuing
this modernizing strategy quickly brought Iran into the 20th
century, embracing western ideals did not sit well with the
country’s Islamic leaders. Their resentment festered, and
as the Shah’s health failed alongside that of the Iranian
economy, conditions were ripe for revolution. Led by the
charismatic holy man Khomeini, the revolution’s goal was
not to simply overthrow the monarchy, but also to replace
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it with a government based on Islamic values. Khomeini and
his followers had remarkable success in quickly
establishing a theocracy and de-secularizing a culture that
had been at least two generations in the making.
D. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WILL TO WIN
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the benefits of an
organization’s strong will to win can be summed up in terms
of legitimacy, commitment, membership, and longevity.
Although both Iran and Iraq benefited from the will to win,
Iran definitely had the advantage.
The adoption of Shiite fundamentalism in Iran lent the
new government instant legitimacy with the masses. Already
a part of everyday life, Islam provided stability during
the last chaotic days of the Shah and also gave the masses
the idea that they could least exert some self-
determination in the new government. Shiite
fundamentalists quickly spread throughout the public and
private sectors, including the military, to ensure that
anywhere Iranians gathered the correct revolutionary
message was delivered (Metz, 1987). This indoctrination
effort resulted in cohesion among the masses and support
for the new government. Having helped whip up this new
religious fervor, Khomeini was able to carry this
enthusiasm into the war with Iraq. To fuel the fire,
Khomeini characterized Husayn as a corrupt infidel whose
actions resembled those of the Shah. By fighting Husayn,
Khomeini said, the Iranians were fighting to protect Islam
from the Iraqi leader who was trying to destroy it.
According to Khomeini, the surprise invasion in 1980 was
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proof enough of Husayn’s intentions. With sermons like
these to inspire the masses, Khomeini was able to elicit a
strong commitment from his followers to defeat the Iraqis
at all costs (Hiro, 1991).
In addition to the legitimacy Islam granted the new
government, the large membership base, which essentially
included all Shiite Muslims, provided Khomeini with an
instant force of committed followers that ensured stability
during the early, turbulent days of the revolution.
Although Khomeini’s natural ability to inspire his
followers was extraordinary, it would take something more
to energize the masses to respond to Iraq’s surprise
attack. Analysts believe that Iraqi forces would have
rolled all the way to Tehran if it had not been for a fast
and spirited Iranian response. To defend the nation, the
regime recalled veterans from the old Imperial Army and
recruited at least 100,000 volunteers for the People’s
Militia. Despite their lack of training and military
leadership, these troops were committed to the religious
cause as they marched into battle. Some members even went
so far as to carry their own burial shrouds into battle in
the expectation of martyrdom and a free trip to paradise
should they be killed (Pike, 1999).
Although Islam provided Iranian forces with the
motivation and commitment to fight the Iraqis, religion’s
predicted effect on the outcome of the battle was not
always guaranteed. Khomeini expected to be able to
influence the Iraqi Shiite population to rise up and
overthrow Husayn, much as the Iranian fundamentalists had
defeated the Shah. Instead, the Iraqi Shiites rallied
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around their government, feeling that any Persian
occupation of their homeland would be a national dishonor.
(Hiro, 1991) This was one of many instances when the idea
of nationalism appeared to be just as important a motivator
as religion for both sides.
Religion played a lesser role for Iraq’s secular
government. Baath Party leader Michel Aflaq felt that
Islam should be considered a civilization as well as a
religion. For a secular government to succeed in a
multicultural environment, the cultural and
“civilizational” aspects of Islam would have to be
emphasized. Such a government could not rely solely on
legal and religious issues for its legitimacy. Much as
Christianity influences the western democracies, he felt
Islam should have a similar effect in Iraq, bridging the
gap between Iraq’s various groups. Not only did this
liberal view of government fit in with the Sunni beliefs,
but it also encouraged the leadership to use nationalist
rhetoric as well as religion to energize the masses.
To appeal to Iraqi Muslims, Husayn liked to portray
himself as a pious man, but usually only when Iran was on
the offensive (Hiro, 1991). Husayn even attempted to use
the ancient Persian-Arab feud to motivate Iraqi soldiers
and the population. However, in spite of these efforts,
there is little evidence that any of Husayn’s schemes
inspired any fervor in Iraqis. In fact, the performance of
the Iraqi Shiite conscripts was very poor, especially when
fighting fellow Shiites on Iranian soil. Only when the
Iranian counter-attack reached Iraqi soil did it appear
that a form of nationalism or self-preservation became a
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factor. Although the invading Iranians shared more with
them than did their Iraqi countrymen, the Iraqi Shiites
remained loyal to Husayn when fighting in their homeland
(Workman, 1994). A similar situation occurred across the
border in Iran. Some of what lured Iraq to conquer
Khuzestan was the fact that Iranian Arabs inhabited it.
Husayn believed (much as Khomeini did vis-à-vis the Iraqi
Shiites) that the Khuzestan Arabs would join him and rebel
against the Khomeini regime. But such a rebellion never
materialized. Nor did the Khuzestan Arabs inject any life
into the Iraqi Army’s waning momentum (Pike, 1999).
Because of the secular nature of the Iraqi government,
stories of Iraqi nationalism on the battlefield are not a
complete surprise. However, displays of Iranian
nationalism on the battlefield, especially after the
fundamentalist-inspired purges, might not be so expected.
The loyalty of the professional Iranian military was still
questionable, and as a result, a number of Iranian Air
Force pilots were jailed. During the Battle of Dezful in
Khuzestan, the Iranian field commander pleaded with the
chain of command for air support from a nearby Iranian air
base. Iranian President Bani Sadr took a chance and
authorized the release of the jailed pilots. Surprisingly,
the pilots manned their aircraft and helped slow the Iraqi
advance. Whatever their motivation - whether commitment to
the nation or to Islam - the actions of these American-
trained pilots throughout the war were admirable and at
times tactically brilliant (Pike, 1999).
Nor were such incidents isolated. In the early years,
once regular army units were finally deployed, they proved
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eager to fight and sought opportunities to regain prestige
lost through having been associated with the Shah (Metz,
1987).
It is interesting to note that these acts occurred
early in the war. It was during this period that military
professionals left over from the Shah’s reign were mixing
with those loyal to the new regime. Even while the
revolutionary forces were fighting the Iraqis, the Iranian
mullahs were conducting an active campaign for the
‘Islamization’ of all Iranian institutions, including the
armed forces. Once this was complete, religion rather than
nationalism became the driving factor for Iranian success
for the remainder of the war.
The influence of the will to win on longevity should
be obvious. Already noted as the longest conventional war
of the twentieth century, both sides appeared willing to
fight indefinitely and only stopped when the superpowers
and the United Nations intervened. What, other than the
will to win, could have sustained both sides in the face of
such punishing losses?
The purpose of this study has been to examine whether
religion gave the Iraqi or Iranian soldier an extra weapon
on the battlefield. We have assumed that if all other
things are equal, religious motivation will give the
soldier something extra. With this desire or will to win,
a weaker force can overcome a stronger force and defeat it
in battle. The Iran-Iraq War makes for an interesting case
study because of the presumed influence that Islam had
throughout the region. Also, the tremendous losses
suffered by Iran and Iraq in men and materiel indicate that
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there was something deep-felt and intangible motivating
soldiers on both sides.
From a western perspective, it appeared that Iraq had
a decisive advantage during the war. However, Iran was
able to respond thanks to its desire to survive, which was
transformed into a desire to win. Iran’s leaders marshaled
religion to tremendous effect. In contrast, religion
played a minor role in Iraq. Iraq already had a well-
established government and military structure in place and
did not need the organizational benefits provided by
religion. Husayn tried to use religion as a motivator, but
only when Iranian forces were threatening. Husayn also
attempted to use the idea of Islamic martyrdom to inspire
his forces, but it appears that he motivated more soldiers
with the barrel of a gun than with promise of eternal
paradise.
In our analysis we have noted that Iraq was the more
technologically superior of the two countries.
Unfortunately, Husayn was unable to motivate his forces to
fight effectively throughout the war even with superior
equipment. If only the Iraqis had been able to marry the
two elements it is likely they would have rolled all the
way to Tehran and toppled Iran’s new government.
Alternatively, Husayn could have made more effective
use of Iraqi nationalism. As it is, this appears to have
been a decisive factor in two areas. First, there is the
example of the loyalty of the Iraqi Shiites. Surprisingly,
what could be described as nationalist feelings overcame
their religious loyalties and prevented a rebellion in
southern Iraq. Second, is the example of how well the
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Iraqi armed forces fought once they returned to Iraqi soil.
It would seem that for the Iraqis, nationalism played just
as important a role in the conduct of the war as Islam did
for the Iranians.
Without its emphasis on religion, the Iranian
government probably would have succumbed. Not only did
Islam provide inspiration, but organization and leadership
as well. Religion did prove to be a deciding factor on a
number of occasions and may have been even more effective
if only the Iranians had all the technological capabilities
of their opponents.
In the final analysis, if Iraq had not possessed
technological superiority, it would not have been able to
hold off the Iranian advances. If Iran’s motivated forces
had not been hobbled by the arms embargo, the war would
have ended up one-sided in Iran’s favor. In the end, the
will to win, fueled by religion and nationalism, did make a
difference and inspired the Iranians to fight to a draw.
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VII.ANALYSIS AND RELEVANCE
A. AMERICA’S WILL TO WIN IN MODERN CONFLICT
As the twentieth century came to a close, the United
States remained the only nation capable of exerting its
political and economic influence worldwide. To implement
its policies, the US maintains a military force capable of
projecting its strength, anywhere in the world. Not only
does the US act to protect its interests, but it also
responds to its allies’ requests for assistance. Not all
of these requests are met with enthusiasm. Nevertheless,
the US has deployed its military forces numerous times
during the last fifty years to fight in some form of
asymmetric conflict. From the campaign to stop the flow of
illegal drugs to the current war against terrorism, the US
has had many opportunities to fight different types of
asymmetric war. Given the current state of affairs, this
trend is likely to continue.
Despite the fact that the US is well versed in this
type of warfare, we have done only a mediocre job at best
when it comes to recognizing our enemy’s strengths and
weaknesses and then employing an effective strategy to
defeat our foe. What policy-makers have failed to
recognize is the influence that the will to win has on the
outcome of a long-term struggle. This will was clearly in
evidence during the Vietnam War, and again on the streets
of Somalia some twenty years later. Unlike other
characteristics of a fighting force ― leadership, strategy,
tactics, and preparation mentioned earlier in this thesis ―
the will to win is intangible, and impossible to measure or
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quantify. This fact makes countering this will using
conventional methods very difficult. As counter-insurgency
expert J. Bowyer Bell (1999) states, “It is difficult to
bring weapons to bear on a dream…” (p. 423). Without
‘hard’ targets to attack, US military planners must focus
their efforts on other areas in order to defeat the
opposition in an asymmetric war. In these cases, strength
does not guarantee success. As Bell (1999) notes,
More does not assure triumph, for if there is not
will at the center then all the things, the men
in nifty uniforms, the money in the bank and the
materials, the helicopters and hospitals and
electronic gear, will not matter (p. 170).
This does not mean that strength is not important. On the
contrary, strength does play an important part in achieving
victory. Ultimately, a weak force with a strong desire to
win must gain strength in order to survive. Conversely,
the strong force must maintain a desire to win in order to
effectively use its strength on the battlefield.
B. CAN THE U.S. COUNTER SPIRITUAL MOTIVATION?
In light of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, questions about the United States’ ability to fight
spiritually or religiously motivated groups have never been
more relevant. The US can counter spiritual motivation in
one of two ways: by attacking the enemy’s motivation, or
by boosting (or encouraging) Americans’ will to fight.
These methods are complimentary and are more effective when
used in tandem. Also, altering the enemy’s sources of
motivation is a time-consuming process which has to take
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place ‘over there’, while boosting America’s will to win
can be done here at home in much less time.
1. Attack the Strengths of Motivation
In the current asymmetric war against terrorism, the
US counter-strategy appears to be very simple: re-assure
the victims and punish the perpetrators, including those
who aid terrorist efforts. This policy, although effective
in appeasing the typical American citizen, does little to
address the root of the problem. Analysts must go deeper
and design national strategies that affect the faith of the
believers in their cause. To do this, US responses should
focus on attacking their motivation. Or, to be more
specific, we need to attack the tangible characteristics
that give the rallying cause ― in this case religion ― its
strength to motivate. Through the case studies examined in
this thesis, we have sought to illustrate just how useful
religion can be. Religion’s use in terms of the logic of
appropriateness, as a means of identity, a source of
rationality, and as an internally consistent logic were
determined to be keys to a weaker force being able to
defeat a stronger force over the long run. Therefore,
these are the characteristics that a stronger force
likewise needs to focus on in order to effectively counter
the enemy.
a. Appropriateness
Appropriateness is difficult to undermine and
often more difficult to verify. Changing the beliefs of
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the true believer with some kind of certainty is nearly
impossible. Yet, the purist can be shaken. Peter Partner
(1997) writes, “Purity is an immensely important religious
concept, and an immensely important religious weapon” (p.
309). However, purity as a weapon is a double-edged sword.
The religious leader who interprets and spreads his faith
also becomes a model for that faith. If it is possible to
destroy the character and impugn the purity of the leader,
the followers’ faith in the cause will start to wane. This
type of attack may focus on the actions or words of the
leader and could possibly expose the leader as a fraud to
his followers. For example, a well-known religious leader
in the US fathered at least one child as the result of an
affair with a co-worker. Despite hiding behind seemingly
invincible armor, this church leader has become more of a
punch line for jokes than a spiritual leader. As a result,
a leader whose opinion had great power at one time has been
rendered nearly ineffectual. The same tactic could be used
to attack the leadership of terrorist organizations. There
is a caveat to this strategy, though. True believers may
overlook the faults of their leaders and remain loyal to
the cause, in which case the group may become stronger even
as attacks are launched against its leaders.
b. Identity
Identity is probably the most difficult
characteristic to undermine. It is difficult because even
the hint of altering an identity automatically puts people
on the defensive. This ‘Us vs. Them’ mentality provides
the enemy’s leadership with a strong cause around which to
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rally. While the contrast between East vs. West and rich
vs. poor, for example, is fairly obvious, the dividing
lines within an organization can be difficult to define.
In the Muslim world, the difference between the Islamist,
the Islamic fundamentalist, and the Islamic extremist are
unclear. Partner (1997) notes that, “Almost all Islamists
adopt a position of strong hostility to what they term
cultural westernization” (p. 249). Yet clearly, this
hostility manifests itself differently in each individual.
Views can vary from rabid hatred to passive acceptance.
Not only may any attempt to influence a group be difficult,
but also it is best to remember to not place all of its
members in one category. The effort must be general enough
to influence a major portion of the membership, yet
specific in its message to remain effective. A foreign
policy based on too limited a view of religion can be as
ineffective as carpet-bombing: it can all too quickly
create hostility among the intended audience that can never
be overcome.
c. Rationality
Rationality appears to be the easiest
characteristic to undermine. As mentioned in an earlier
chapter, the rational individual plans for the future and,
assuming he believes in life after death, will do
everything he can to prepare for the afterlife. Life in
the present, however, requires that immediate needs often
take precedence over preparations for eternity. Religion
provides solutions for both of these problems. A religious
community can meet the needs of the present and immediate
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future by offering education, training, medicine, food, and
shelter. Religion also meets the needs of the afterlife by
providing the structure and guidance to guarantee the
believer an eternal life. To counter the strength of the
rational aspects of religion, policy-makers should not
attempt to restrict the religion in any way, but rather
recognize the needs that a religion addresses and satisfy
these more quickly and efficiently than the religion can.
For example, a religious organization may provide a
community with some rudimentary medical care. In an effort
to lessen the religious organization’s grip on the
community, a military force could provide a medical team to
do basic checkups and pass out medicine. In this way the
focus group’s needs are met, while the religious influence
is undermined a bit. The religion will continue to provide
spiritual guidance, but the believer begins to rely on
other organizations to meet his more mundane needs. These
actions are critical when fighting an internal asymmetric
conflict, such as that illustrated by the Algeria case
study.
d. Internally Consistent Logic
Undermining the strength provided by adhering to
an internally consistent logic also appears to be a
difficult task, but actually holds the greatest promise.
The Koran, Islam’s holy book, is a collection of
revelations sent to earth through the prophet Muhammad,
which offer guidance about all aspects of Muslim life. As
is the case with most religious texts, the Koran’s
vagueness is significant because this allows the religion
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to seem internally consistent. Vagueness encourages
interpretation, which in turn means the message can be
manipulated to meet the needs of the situation. For
example, the use of ‘jihad,’ which is central to the
survival of Islam, is not used consistently throughout the
Islamic world. According to Islamic law, jihad, which is
the striving or a struggle for the benefit of society, can
only be initiated by a recognized group of religious
leaders (Nüsse, 1998). But this is true only for the Sunni
sect of Islam. In the Shiite sect, only the Messiah on his
return to earth can call for jihad. Islamic splinter
groups, meanwhile, follow neither law when calling for
jihad and may simply initiate jihad in order to get a clip
on the evening news. This example illustrates
inconsistencies in the use of Islamic law. While this
varied interpretation of religious doctrine is not unusual,
it must be remembered that, in the case of Islam, its
followers regard adherence to Islamic law as a cornerstone
of their belief. To attack the internally consistent
logic, policy makers must seek out and expose the
inconsistencies and corruption prevalent in religious
interpretations and actions.
The ability to interpret the Koran by any
believer offers added benefits. Muslims can still worship
according to the Holy Book and not necessarily be under the
influence of religious leaders with questionable
intentions. As was seen with the recent collapse of the
Taliban government in Afghanistan, once the oppressive
leadership was run out of the country, life returned to
some semblance of normalcy. Although the Afghanis shaved
their beards and played music for the first time since the
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Taliban takeover, they remained Muslim. The only thing
that changed was who was interpreting and enforcing Islamic
law, and how strictly they were doing so.
2. American Will
Critics have often claimed that the US lacks the
strong will and perseverance to fight extended wars for
worthwhile causes. On the contrary, Americans seem to be
more than willing to fight the good fight as long as they
believe the cause just. The problem lies in influencing
the will of the individual to merge with the will of the
group. The keys to uniting a group’s will to win are found
in the strength of the group’s faith. Author Shireen
Hunter (1998) understands the West’s indifference to faith
when she notes, “The difference lies in the fact that, in
the western world, religion has lost the battle with
secularism, whereas in the Muslim world and in Israel the
contest continues” (p. 56). Hunter does not imply that
religion is completely unifying, and in fact discusses at
length the absence of unity and uniformity in the Muslim
world. The difference instead lies in the fact that the
secular west is unlikely to use religion or faith as a
motivator.
Critics contend that in an asymmetric war, the United
States would have a weaker will to win than its opponent
because of the perceived lack of perseverance of the
American people. Whether this belief is true or not,
creating and maintaining an appropriate desire to win is a
continuous challenge for the US national leadership. To
achieve this resolve, secular governments must rely on the
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same type of commitment, legitimacy, membership, and
longevity that a religious organization gains from using
religion as a motivator. Using religion as a motivator ―
to foster the will to win ― amounts to an organic solution
that is defensive in nature and, as a result, is probably
more sustainable. In a secular society, the equivalent has
to be found elsewhere.
The United States, for example, has relied on
nationalism a number of times to steel citizen’s resolve,
and this has proved to be just as effective as religious
fundamentalism has been in other parts of the world. The
public’s reaction to the September 11 attacks demonstrates
the power of nationalism to rally support. Critics will no
doubt point out the fact that because the attack occurred
within the US’s borders, this represents a unique case.
But while this may be factually true, there are other
recent events that prove that when presented to the
American public in the right way, causes elsewhere can be
equally compelling. For instance, public support for
Operation DESERT STORM was quite high because the national
leadership was able to effectively present a case for
conducting that war.
Attacking the enemy’s motivation centers can yield
quicker and more visible effects than building consensus at
home, but may also produce results of limited duration
because the enemy continues to evolve. As Bell (1999)
points out, “Enemies are necessary to the faith” (p. 172),
and America, by virtue of its global influence, is a
natural enemy for those who seek enemies to bolster their
legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that in
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asymmetric wars, the US’s presence is a motivator in and of
itself. For example, in Iran during the 1970s, and today
with bin Ladin’s forces, Islam provided the initial
motivation, and will continue to provide the core
motivation, but hatred for the United States stirred up by
an aggressive propaganda campaign has added considerable
fuel to the fire.
a. Commitment
It has often been said that US foreign policy
contributes to rather than solves problems. Although the
US has the resources to react to any situation, anywhere in
the world, the nation often lacks the commitment to
consistently set policy and see it through to completion.
What happened in Somalia in 1993 is often cited as an
example of mission failure. According to common belief,
the US was deeply involved in Somalia, but the government
feared public support would plummet after its forces
suffered numerous casualties during a raid on an Aideed
stronghold. As a result, the situation in Somalia after
America’s departure was no better than before the forces
first landed in Mogadishu. This synopsis of events,
although factually correct, only refers to a single
incident. In contrast to using the Somali case and
extrapolating from it, consider just how committed
Americans have been in other places and at other times.
Perseverance for a just cause is woven into the national
fabric. US efforts during World War II and the Cold War
are but two examples of the level of commitment of which
Americans are capable. The main difference between Somalia
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and World War II is that in 1941 the American people were
given a reason to fight. Defeating the Axis powers was not
only the right thing to do, but it was also understood to
be a matter of national survival. The situation in Somalia
was nebulous to begin with and got even more confusing as
it developed. The American people were never convinced
that deploying forces to Somalia was necessary and, as a
result, they were never committed to the cause.
America’s current war on terrorism, although
still unclear in many areas, has the advantage that the
precipitating events ― the September 11 attacks ― took
place on home soil, and there is at least one person who
can be identified as the enemy. Therefore, national
commitment to the cause can be sustained fairly
effectively, but for how long? That will depend, in part
on the national leadership’s ability to remind us why we
should remain committed.
b. Legitimacy
Finding legitimacy in an offensive campaign, no
matter what the cause, can be difficult for the American
public. All confrontations consist of offense and defense
and, at some point, each side must choose to defend or
attack. American history suggests that we prefer to
attack. The axiom, “The best defense is a good offense,”
is part of our national ethos. Whether, in fact, a good
offense is the best defense does not matter when it comes
to legitimacy because perception defines legitimacy. A
defensive posture will always be considered more legitimate
than an offensive posture. The fight for survival or self-
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defense is understood by everyone to be a legitimate reason
to act. The offensive stance, however, no matter what the
claimed injustices, will never be accepted by everyone as a
legitimate reason to attack. This is why terms such as
homeland defense and force protection are constantly being
used now to re-enforce the idea that the American public is
engaged in a just war. Yet, to maintain this defensive
posture while concealing an offensive attitude may require
a proactive, rather than a reactive propaganda campaign
aimed at the American public.
c. Membership
As citizens of a nation-state, members of the
American public are automatically assumed to comprise the
membership supporting the cause. America’s sheer size and
three hundred million people give it a large base of
natural resources and people from which to draw. These
characteristics, however, will not always guarantee
victory. Without a common goal or national priority, any
effort to solve a problem will fail. With continual
failure, the public will lose faith in the cause and refuse
to support it. In a struggle for national survival, the
defensive nature of the conflict assures membership
participation and support. To win a conflict, though,
requires an offensive campaign at some point. This is
where the government cannot afford for citizens to lose
faith. Therefore, the national leadership must use all
means available to succeed in the conflict (even if this
means lots of small victories). The government can then
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maintain the confidence of its citizenry and eventually
prevail in its goals.
d. Longevity
A secular government must ensure its longevity in
order to defeat its enemies. This ability to endure
manifests itself from a combination of the other three
factors; longevity depends on the public’s commitment, the
government’s legitimacy, and the nation’s membership. It
also requires that the government be flexible enough to
change as the security environment changes. Just as
religion has adapted over the years to meet the needs of
its followers, governments have to do the same in order to
survive. This ability to adapt results in a system that
accommodates its citizens’ needs and addresses their
concerns. This, in turn, guarantees commitment from its
followers who see it as something worth propagating. With
commitment and belief in the national cause, you get
legitimacy and, with legitimacy, you get membership, all of
which collectively contribute to the will to win. Securing
longevity, then, is the key to fostering America’s will to
win.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
When research and discussion began on this thesis,
there was no way to know that it would have such relevance
in terms of current events. Experts theorized that the
United States would eventually be involved in some type of
asymmetric conflict. Although some of these experts may
have thought that this battle would take place on US soil,
no one could have guessed the impact of September 11, 2001.
The audacity and precise execution of those attacks has
made it clear to the United States, and the rest of the
world, that terrorism has taken a huge leap from the car
bombs and hijackings that have defined terrorism up until
this point. What made these attacks different was that the
terrorists changed the hijacking paradigm.
In the past, hijackers relied on pilots to meet their
demands and fly them where they wanted to go. Everyone
seemed to accept this as the standard scenario - until the
first aircraft struck the first World Trade Center tower.
Initially, no one could believe that a pilot would fly into
a building on purpose. Even under duress, the experts
hypothesized, the pilot could easily miss and crash into
the bay. Then, we learned, the aircraft were all piloted
by Islamic extremists who, after having learned to fly in
the US, commandeered the aircraft and committed the
ultimate sacrifice in their jihad against the United
States.
Once the picture began to emerge about what happened,
the next question was, why did it happen? The world
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situation had changed little in the last ten years; there
appeared to be no significant events to precipitate such an
attack. Yet, not only had the conspiracy been planned, for
quite some time, but the terrorists had also been living
and training in the United States for months, if not
longer. Besides their extraordinary good luck and near
flawless execution, the other thing that stands out about
the terrorists was their ability to stay motivated for
their mission and to stay focused on their assigned tasks
despite being given every opportunity to stray.
It appears that the terrorists’ desire to succeed was
stronger than any obstacle placed before them. The
question then is, what was the source of this motivation
and what can the US do to counter it in the future? The
motivation seems to stem, at least in part, from religion.
Although every major religion has had moments when the
faith of its members was tested under extreme
circumstances, it appears that Islam is the only religion
able to consistently call on its believers to pay the
ultimate price.
B. THE FUTURE
In this thesis, religion as a motivator and its effect
on the will to win were explored using three similar, yet
different case studies. Also, asymmetric warfare and the
nature and role of religion were discussed. Religion gains
its strength from at least four factors: appropriateness,
identity, rationality and its use as an internally
consistent logic. It is this strength that appears to
provide the individual with the will to fight what seems to
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be the un-winnable fight. As this thesis suggests, once an
individual is religiously motivated, an organization can
tap into this and gain specific advantages that also allow
it to sustain and further its efforts. Through religious
motivation, the group gains commitment, legitimacy,
membership, and longevity. As was pointed out, often a
group only has to survive to win the war in spite of the
fact that the group may have lost every battle.
What makes religion the near perfect motivator is that
all of these components feed off of each other. As was
seen in the case studies, given its proven longevity
religion has legitimacy. This legitimacy secures the
commitment of its followers. Together, longevity,
legitimacy, and the commitment of others eventually
encourage more people to join, thereby helping increase the
membership and benefiting the organization in innumerable
ways. With all of these elements feeding off of each
other, any organization looking for a philosophy by which
to legitimize its cause would do well to look toward
religion or a similar motivator (like nationalism).
Although it may seem impossible to defeat a group that
is religiously motivated, and though the war would likely
be lengthy, the job can be done if US strategy focuses on
undermining the elements that provide religion its
strength. These elements are appropriateness, identity,
rationality, and religion’s use as an internally consistent
logic. In addition, the US can foster and sustain the same
level of commitment, legitimacy, membership, and longevity
among its population by focusing on nationalism rather than
religion. With a well-balanced, long-term strategy that
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supports our desire to win, the United States can ensure
that no foe can best us in an asymmetric war.
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